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THE ZUNI QUEST FOR REPATRIATION OF THE WAR




In the last fifteen years, Native American tribes have become in-
creasingly active in their campaigns to secure the repatriation of cul-
tural and religious objects from institutions, galleries, and private
collections. Recently, several museums returned wampum belts to the
Iroquois Nation. Similarly, other museums in the Southwest and Can-
ada returned medicine bundles and prayer boards to the Navajo, Hopi
and Mohawk tribes.1 In 1989, Harvard's Peabody Museum returned a
sacred totem pole to the Omaha Indians.2
This comment addresses the Zuni Tribe's quest for repatriation of
its sacred cultural and religious icons, the War Gods, and this author's
contention that the Zuni Tribe can bolster its claim to the Gods by
declaring that it is a sovereign nation.3 As such, the tribe would be
entitled to the return of its cultural property based on established rules
of customary international law.
The introduction gives a brief summary of the significance of the
War Gods in Zuni life. This information is crucial for understanding
why the Zuni People hold repatriation of the War Gods so important.
Next follows an explanation of the argument which the Zunis have
already used successfully to persuade collectors to return icons. Finally,
the comment expounds an alternative theory upon which the Zunis
can base their reclamation efforts.
4
This comment argues that the Zuni Tribe is a sovereign nation, and
that customary international law mandates the return of cultural prop-
* J.D., 1992, magna cum laude, Case Western Reserve University School of Law;
B.S., 1980, cum laude, State University of New York at Buffalo. The author currently
resides in Boston, Mass., and is seeking a position in Indian law. The author wishes to
thank Professor Erik M. Jensen of the Case Western Reserve University School of Law
for his encouragement and helpful discussions during the writing of this comment.
First place winner, 1991-92 American Indian Law Review Writing Competition.
1. Rogers Worthington, Reclaiming a Bit of Its Past Culture, Tribe Celebrates
Return of Totem Pole, Cm. TRm., Aug. 20, 1989, at 21.
2. Id.
3. The War Gods are sometimes referred to by their Zuni name, Ahayu:da.
4. Indian tribes are also making demands to secure the skeletal remains and
associated funerary objects of their ancestors. This related issue is beyond the scope of
this comment.
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1992
590 AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW [Vol. 17
erty to claiming nations. First, the comment explores the historical
justification for classifying tribes as sovereign states. Second, the
comment discusses various theories of statehood. Finally, the comment
reviews evidence which supports the theory that customary interna-
tional law exists which requires the return of cultural property.
Significance of the Zuni War Gods
The Zunis seek the return of the War Gods because the Gods are
sacred and inextricably intertwined with the cultural and religious life
of the Zuni people.' According to a statement made by the religious
leaders of the Zuni Tribe in 1978, "[a]ll religious ... objects, no
matter how insignificant.., they may seem to non-Zunis, are of...
great religious value." 6 Generally, all religious objects serve to "provide
both a beneficial psychological and physical environment for the Zuni
people." 7 The Zunis believe that the War Gods possess great powers.
Religious leaders convince the "adolescent, mischievous" Gods to use
their powers for positive purposes.8 Sadly, when collectors illicitly
remove the War Gods from their shrines and take them from Zuni
lands, it is believed that the icons will wreak havoc with the natural
environment. Their "destructive powers are unleashed." 9 The removal
of a War God can result in "military conflicts, fires, earthquakes,
floods, tornados, hurricanes and other violent occurrences."'' 0
Each year members of the Bear and Deer clans carve two War Gods
to serve as guides and guardians to the entire tribe." The worship of
these Gods ensures tribal "safety, health and success."' 2 After the
War Gods serve their one year tenure as guardians of the tribe, clan
members place them in hidden shrines where they decay exposed to
the elements. The Zunis believe decomposition of the Gods replenishes
the earth with their powers.
5. Telephone Interview with Joseph Dishta, Head Tribal Councilman of the Zuni
Tribe (Mar. 5, 1991).
6. Religious Leaders of the Pueblo of Zuni, Statement Concerning Sacred Zuni
Religious Items/Artifacts (Sept. 20, 1978), in Bowen Blair, Note, Indian Rights: Native
Americans Versus American Museums - A Battle for Artifacts, 7 Am. INDIAN L. REV.
125, 151 (1979).
7. Id. at 152.
8. Telephone Interview with T.J. Ferguson, Anthropologist with the American
Institute of the North American West (Mar. 13, 1991). Ferguson served as director of
the Zuni Archeology Program from 1976 to 1981.
9. David Firestone, Rescue in Manhattan: A Zuni God Goes Home, NEWSDAY
(New York, N.Y.), May 27, 1988, pt. II, at 2.
10. T.J. Ferguson & Wilfred Eriacho, Ahayu:da Zuni War Gods, NATIVE PEOPLES,
THE ARTS AND LIPEWAYS, Fall 1990, at 6, 7 (vol. 4, no. 1).
11. Roberto Suro, Zunis' Effort to Regain Idols May Alter Views of Indian Art,
N.Y. TimS, Aug. 13, 1990, at Al.
12. Rebecca Clay, Who Owns Indian Artifacts?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug.
28, 1990, at 12.
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Given the major role the War Gods play in the daily lives of the
Zuni, the great positive powers they possess, and the destruction they
can cause if removed from Zuni land, the tribe anxiously seeks the
repatriation of all War Gods not in their possession as soon as possible.
One should not think of the War Gods as antiquated Indian "arti-
facts";" rather, they are powerful "animate" entities which play an
important daily role in the living culture and religious rites of tribal
members.' 4 In fact, the War Gods are essential for the continued
spiritual well-being of the Zuni Tribe.' 5
Zuni Argument for Repatriation of the War Gods
The Zunis, anthropologists, and archaeologists believe that thieves
have stolen all War Gods not at their shrines. 16 Many museums do
not possess clear records documenting the transactions which led to
the acquisition of Zuni War Gods. 17 Even if the War Gods had been
conveyed, appropriated or alienated by a tribal member to a third
party, the resulting basis of third party ownership remains fatally
flawed. Tribal law stipulates that the War Gods are community prop-
erty of the entire tribe and, thus, no individual can rightfully sell or
give away any icon.'"
Since 1978, the tribal council and religious leaders of the Zuni Pueblo
of New Mexico, with the assistance of T.J. Ferguson, an anthropol-
13. Thomas H. Boyd, Disputes Regarding the Possession of Native American
Religious and Cultural Objects and Human Remains: A Discussion of the Applicable
Law and Proposed Legislation, 55 Mo. L. Rav. 883, 883 n.3 (1990). In his article,
Boyd points out that use of the term "artifact" with reference to Native American
cultural objects is inappropriate because it "fails to reflect the great contemporary value
these cultural and religious objects hold for Native Americans." Id.
14. See Firestone, supra note 9. The Zunis believe that the War Gods are not only
the "supreme physical objects of worship" but also animate objects with emotions and
sensations. See also Blair, supra note 6, at 152. The religious leaders state that religious
items created with inanimate materials gain "spiritual life to perform the benefits for
the Zuni people" through prayer and instruction during construction of the particular
item. Id.
15. Telephone Interview with Joseph Dishta, supra note 5.
16. Telephone Interview with T.J. Ferguson, supra note 8; see also Barton Martza,
On The Trail Of The Zuni War Gods, Zum HIsToRY, VicTos iN To 1990s (Inst.
NorthAmerican West & Zuni Archaeology Program, Zuni, N.M.), 1991, § II, at 12.
Martza revealed how two of the War Chiefs discovered documents in a tin can while
on a pilgrimage to a War God shrine in Twin Buttes. The documents led to a discovery
that surveyors in the 1800s had removed War Gods. Eventually these War Gods ended
up in the Denver Museum.
17. Robert Adams, Smithsonian Horizons: Repatriation of Native American Re-
mains and Artifacts, SmrrsomAN, vol. 21 no. 7, at 10.
18. See Suro, supra note 11; see also Blair, supra note 6, at 151 ("No one individual
or a group(s) of individual(s) has/have the right to remove communally owned religious
items/artifacts from the Zuni land for any purpose/reason whatsoever. This is illegal
according to traditional Zuni law, and to do so is tantamount to theft .... ").
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ogist, and Edmund Ladd, curator of Ethnology at the State Museum
of Indian Arts and Culture, have actively sought the recovery of War
Gods from various museums, galleries, and private collections.' 9 To
justify the. claim, proponents of repatriation have primarily relied on
the community property theory. Using only the power of persuasion,
the Zunis have successfully retrieved many of their War Gods without
having to resort to litigation. Convinced of the moral rectitude of the
Zuni position, museums, galleries, and private collectors have coop-
erated to return the War Gods. As of May, 1991, the Zunis have
repatriated sixty-five War Gods formerly housed in thirty-four mu-
seums and private collections. 20 These recovered icons represent all
known War Gods of the Zunis contained in United States museum
collections. Also in May, 1991, the Zunis awaited the imminent re-
patriation of the last remaining War Gods known to exist in a private
collection. 2'
Statement of an Alternative Legal Theory to Support Repatriation
This theory has two major parts. Part one posits that the Zuni Tribe
is a. sovereign state or independent nation under international law. For
cultural purposes only, the tribe may be considered a state. The tribe
also qualifies as a full fledged state because it satisfies the four elements
of statehood.
The crux of part two is that international customary law requires
one state to return cultural objects to another demanding state when
the particular objects possess a special significance to the national
patrimony of the demanding state. In other words, persons holding
objects integral to the claiming state's cultural identity must return
them.22 This custom is particularly binding when the objects were
wrongfully conveyed in the first place. Putting both parts of the theory
together, the Zuni Tribe, based on its sovereign status, can demand
the return of the War Gods by relying on customary international law.
Given the overwhelming success the Zunis have enjoyed in recovering
their War Gods, it might seem unnecessary to establish an alternative
legal basis for claim. Congress and state legislatures have been sup-
portive of the Native American position on the disposition of cultural
objects? The Native American Grave Protection and Repatriation Act
.19. Telephone Interview with T.J. Ferguson, supra note 8.
2G. Id.
1. Id.
22. On first blush, this brief recitation of a custom that involves returning cultural
objects to the nation with which they are "historically associated" sounds like the
cultural nationalism argument set forth in John H. Merryman, Thinking About the
Elgin Marbles, 83 M1cH. L. REv. 1881 (1985) [hereinafter Merryman, Elgin Marbles].
As will be discussed later, the theory proposed here diverges from a cultural nationalism
argument. See infra text accompanying notes 221-49.
23. Boyd, supra note 13, at 906.
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of 1990 (NAGPRA)2 requires federally funded museums to perform
summary inventories of sacred objects and objects of cultural patri-
mony. Indian tribes may then mandate repatriation according to a
priority scheme established in NAGPRA.2 Similar provisions, specific
to the Smithsonian Institution, have been proposed as amendments to
the National Museum of the American Indian Act of 1990.26
Nonetheless, the Zunis may face opposition to their claims in the
future. The tribe believes other War Gods remain in museums and
private collections in the United States, although these Gods have not
been identified. 27 The federal statutes previously cited only apply to
cultural objects in the possession of federally funded museums; there-
fore, there is currently no legal recourse that allows Zunis to secure
restitution of War Gods which may reside in privately owned museums
and collections. One writer has argued, although moral arguments for
return have been successful, they are "literally, not legitimate ....
The grounds for recognition [of these claims] must be both equitable
and legal."12 Also, the Zunis believe War Gods reside in collections
in other countries. 29 The Zunis hope to initiate international repatria-
tion efforts now that they have retrieved all of the "domestic" War
Gods known to be out of their possession. 0 Conceivably, foreign
collectors will not as readily accommodate the Zunis as American
collectors, hence, the need for an international law basis for the Zunis'
claim.
Although the Zunis have concentrated on retrieving the War Gods,
other objects of the cultural patrimony remain in collections to which
the Zunis lay claim.3' Collectors, who incorrectly assume that other
Zuni items hold less sanctity to the Zunis than the War Gods, may
be less willing to give up these "lesser" items. Again, an alternative
legal theory would bolster a Zuni claim to other culturally and reli-
giously significant objects.
This comment focuses primarily on the Zuni claim for the War
Gods, but an alternative theory could be similarly applicable to the
claims made by other Native American tribes for the return of these
24. Pub. L. No. 101-601, 1045 Stat. 3048.
25. Id. (as discussed in H. MARcus PRma III, DispuTno THa DEAD: U.S. LAW ON
ABoRiuIAL REMAINs AND GR&vE GOODs 32-33 (1991)).
26. S. 235, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (proposed amendments to National Museum
of the American Indian Act, 20 U.S.C. § 80q-9 (1990)).
27. Letter from T.J. Ferguson, Anthropologist with the American Institute of the
NorthAmerican West, to author (June 5, 1991) (on file with author).
28. Rebecca Clements, Misconceptions of Culture: Native Peoples and Cultural
Property Under Canadian Law, 49 U. TORoNTo FAC. L. Ray. 1, 3-4 (1991).
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other cultural items. Indeed, the exposition of an international legal
basis for claim would be of use to aboriginal or indigenous peoples
in other countries.
Indian Tribes as Sovereign States Under International Law
Although the United States government has eroded tribal sovereignty
through legislative and judicial action, this federal encroachment does
not alter the following fact: contemporary tribal sovereignty is rooted
in retained, inherent authority from a time when international law
fully endowed tribes with inherent rights.12 Pre-contact era Indian
"state status," coupled with its derivative, inherent sovereignty, lend
validity to present tribal claims of statehood. This is not to suggest
that a tribe may be accorded state status today based solely on a
record of past statehood. If, however, a particular tribe otherwise
possesses certain attributes of statehood, its past status will substantiate
or legitimize the present claim.
It is necessary to trace tribal sovereignty back to its origins in order
to demonstrate the existence of the inherent power described above.
This comment examines history, case law, and the treaty-making power,
against a backdrop of the precepts and requirements of international
law, to accomplish this end.
Although the Bureau of Indian Affairs claims that the Indian tribes
of :he United States never had international status,33 there is authority
which indicates otherwise.34 Even before the arrival of the Europeans,
Indian tribes of North America were, "in varying degrees, organized,
self-governing entities." '31 Their independence and sovereign status was
acknowledged by the Europeans 6 and later by the United States.37
32. The contrasting view is that tribal power derives from and is delegated by the
federal government. This is the main principle embodied in the doctrine of federal
plenary power. Felix Cohen advanced the idea that tribal sovereignty derives from
inherent authority versus federal plenary power. See FEUx S. CoHEN's HANDBOOK OF
FEDiiPRAL INDIAN LAW 229-35 (Rennard L. Strickland et al. eds, 1982) [hereinafter
Com-:N].
33. Frank B. Higgins, International Law Consideration of the American Indian
Nations by the United States, 3 ARtz. L. REv. 74 (1961) (citing U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR,
FEDnRAL INDAN LAw 149 (1958)).
34. See infra text accompanying notes 33-67. It is beyond the scope of this comment
to address how scholars and commentators of the middle ages viewed the nation status
of aboriginal peoples. Suffice it to say that the "forefathers" of international law,
Francisco de Vitoria, Emmerich de Vattel, and Hugo Grotius recognized native sover-
eignty. See John H. Clinebell & Jim Thomson, Sovereignty And Self-Determination:
The Rights Of Native Americans Under International Law, 27 BuFF. L. Rv. 669, 680
(1978).
35. Id. (citations omitted).
36. COHEN, supra note 32, at 50-62.
37. Clinebell & Thomson, supra note 34.
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Henry Knox, Secretary of War under President Washington, felt that
the tribes "ought to be considered foreign nations,"'3 , and Thomas
Jefferson believed "the Indians had the full, undivided and independ-
ent sovereignty as long as they chose to keep it and that this might
be forever." 3 9
An Exploration of the Early Case Law - The Marshall Trilogy
Three nineteenth century Supreme Court cases, Johnson v. McIn-
tosh,40 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,41 and Worcester v. Georgia,42 were
landmarks in the development of a doctrine of Indian tribal sover-
eignty.
In Johnson, the Court held that Johnson's title to land could not
be recognized because the land was conveyed to him by the chiefs of
the Illinois and Piankeshaw nations. This contravened the doctrine of
discovery which gave the United States the "exclusive right to extin-
guish the Indian title of occupancy by purchase or conquest." 43 For
the Court, Justice John Marshall stated:
In the establishment of these relations, the rights of the
original inhabitants were, in no instance, entirely disre-
garded; but were necessarily, to a considerable extent, im-
paired. They were admitted to be the rightful occupants of
the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to retain possession
of it, and to use it according to their own discretion; but
their rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations,
were necessarily diminished, and their power to dispose of
the soil at their own will, to whomsoever they pleased, was
denied by the original fundamental principle, that discovery
gave exclusive title to those who made it.44
Although Marshall seemed to disparage the doctrine of discovery,
he nonetheless acknowledged that it had been adopted by the United
States. He was compelled to recognize its resultant curtailment of tribal
sovereignty.
Marshall's formulation of the status of Indian statehood was further
elucidated in Cherokee Nation. In this case, the Cherokees sought an
injunction to restrain the State of Georgia from exerting legislative
38. Id. at 682 (citing G. HARMON, SmxrY YEARS OF INDIAN A1FAms, PoLIIcAL,
EcoNoMnc, AND DipLOmATC, 1789-1850, at 3 (1941)).
39. Id. (citing FRANcis PRUCHA, Amu.cAN IiwAN Poucy nN THE FoxmATrvE YEARS:
THE INDIAN TRADE AND INTERCOURSE ACTS, 1790-1834, at 141 (1962)).
40. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543 (1823).
41. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
42. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
43. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 587.
44. Id. at 574.
No. 2]
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jurisdiction over their land. The Court did not reach the merits of the
case because it determined that it did not have original jurisdiction
under article III of the Constitution. 4s Although the state of Georgia
could properly be sued, the Cherokee Nation was not a foreign state
in the constitutional context and therefore could not assert its rights
in ithe Supreme Court.46 What is both interesting and disturbing about
the Marshall opinion is its contradictory portrayal of the Cherokee
nation. The following language is instructive:
The Cherokees are a state. They have been uniformly treated
as a state since the settlement of our country. The numerous
treaties made with them by the United States recognize them
as a people capable of maintaining the relations of peace
and war; of being responsible in their political, character
for any violation of their engagements, or for any aggression
committed on the citizens of the United States by any
individual of their community. Laws have been enacted in
the spirit of these treaties. 47
In this, statement, Marshall appeared to admit to the legitimacy of a
Cherokee state. International scholars would have agreed with his
formulation. States who "maintain relations of peace and war" and
are responsible to other states for the violations of their subjects, fit
the concept of statehood set forth in international parlance. 8 However,
in the same segment of the opinion, Marshall went on to state:
It may well be doubted whether those tribes which reside
within the acknowledged boundaries of the United States
can with strict accuracy be denominated foreign nations.
They may more correctly perhaps be denominated domestic
dependent nations. They occupy a territory to which we
assert a title independent of their will, which must take
effect in point of possession when their right of possession
ceases - meanwhile they are in a state of pupilage. Their
relations to the United States resemble that of a ward to
his guardian. 49
45. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, sec. 2, cl. 1. The first clause states, in pertinent part:
"The judicial power shall extend to all cases ... between a State, or the citizens thereof,
and foreign states, citizens, or subjects." Id. The second clause states: "In all cases
... in which a State shall be party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction."
Id. art. III, § 2, cI. 2.
46. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at I.
47. Id. at 14.
48. L[A BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 432-76 (4th ed. 1990)
(chapter 20).
49. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 14.
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Marshall ascribed elements of international sovereignty to the Cher-
okees but almost immediately withdrew from that position. Marshall's
inconsistency may be a result of his difficulty in conceptualizing two
independent nations occupying the same physical territory. He resolved
the conflict by classifying the tribe as a domestic dependent nation,
something less than a nation under international law. The use of the
ward to guardian analogy has been interpreted as a diminishment of
tribal sovereignty. However, one commentator has suggested that Mar-
shall's designation of tribes as wards may just represent his difficulty
in verbalizing the odd juxtaposition of the United States and Indian
tribes.50 Even if we view Marshall's characterization of the Cherokees
as less than favorable, he returned to a more aggressive portrayal of
Indian sovereignty in Worcester.
In Worcester, the Court was able to address the issue of whether
the state of Georgia had jurisdiction over Indian country. The Court
answered in the negative, with a strongly worded opinion that testified
to Cherokee sovereignty.
In formulating his thoughts about the status of the Cherokee nation,
Marshall analyzed the treaties between the United States and the
Cherokees. He noted that the sixth and seventh articles of the Treaty
of Hopewell,"' which deal with "the punishment of citizens of either
country," imply that the United States considered the Cherokees a
nation . 2 Marshall also argued that the ninth article, which specifies
that Congress has the right to regulate trade and manage Indian affairs,
cannot be construed to indicate a Cherokee forfeiture of self-govern-
ment because this would conflict with other operative language of the
article. 3 In his discussion of the Treaty of Holston, 4 Marshall attested
to the treaty's "explicit recogniftion] of the national character of the
Cherokees, and their right of self government despite that nation's
acceptance of protection from a larger, more powerful one." 55 Marshall
relied on international law theory as articulated by Vattel when he
stated that Indian tribes do not forfeit their independence by "asso-
ciating with a stronger [nation], and taking its protection. '5 6
Although Marshall suggested that the Cherokees were a foreign
nation, 7 it is not clear whether he viewed their power of self-govern-
ment as deriving from retained, inherent tribal sovereignty or from
50. Higgins, supra note 33, at 81.
51. Treaty with the Cherokees, Nov. 28, 1785, 7 Stat. 19.
52. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 553.
53. Id.
54. Treaty with the Cherokees, July 2, 1791, 7 Stat. 39.
55. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 556.
56. Id. at 561.
57. See infra text accompanying note 62 (discussing significance of treaties).
No. 2]
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the treaties and statutes which served to supersede state law.58 Marshall
looked to international law scholars for guidance in articulating the
Cherokee nation's status, therefore, it is reasonable to postulate that
he conceptualized the nation as an international entity with inherent
powers of sovereignty.
Significance of Treaty Making
When the British colonists came to America, they executed formal
treaties and agreements with the tribes,5 9 in order to make peace and
to secure their cooperation.6° This is significant because "treaty" is a
term of art in international law. A treaty is an instrument of inter-
national agreement which creates legal rights and duties between sov-
ereign states.61 In Worcester, Marshall attested to the international
nature of Indian treaty making. He wrote:
The constitution, by declaring treaties already made, as
well as those to be made to be the supreme law of the land,
has adopted and sanctioned the previous treaties with the
Indian nations and consequently admits their rank among
those powers who are capable of making treaties. The words
"treaty" and "nation" are words of our own language,
selected in our diplomatic and legislative proceedings, by
ourselves, having each a definite and well understood mean-
ing. We have applied them to Indians, as we have applied
them to the other nations of the earth. They are applied to
all in the same sense. 2
This language provides compelling evidence that Marshall viewed
Indian nations as foreign nations. As discussed earlier, the fact that
the Indian tribes accepted the protection of the United States in treaties,
did not mean they necessarily "surrendered ... their independence.", '63
The United States has argued that even during the treaty-making
era, it did not recognize treaties executed with Indian nations as
58. Earl Mettler, A Unified Theory of Indian Tribal Sovereignty, 30 HASTNos L.J.
89, 101 (1978).
59. Keith M. Werhan, The Sovereignty of Indian Tribes: A Reaffirmation and
Strengthening in the 1970's, 54 NoRnE DAm LAw. 5, 6 (1978).
60. Some commentators attribute the colonists' success in the War of Independence
in part to the fealty of the Natives with whom they treated1. In Worcester, Marshall
discussed Congress's concern that the Indians would forge alliances with the British. He
wrote, "Far from advancing a claim to their lands, or asserting any right of dominion
over them, congress resolved ... to treat with the Indians ... in order to preserve
peace and friendship ... and to prevent their taking any part in the present commo-
tions." Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 549.
61. MARK W. J. ts, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 9 (1988).
62. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 559-60 (emphasis added).
63. Higgins, supra note 33, at 80.
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enforceable under international law.64 The related assertion that Indian
nations were not foreign entities is contradicted by judicial opinions
and by the negative implications of the rider on the Indian Appropri-
ations Act of 1871 .6 That rider stated that "[n]o Indian nation or
tribe within the territory of the United States shall be acknowledged
or recognized as an independent nation, tribe or power with whom
the United States may contract by treaty."6 It. may be inferred from
the declaration that the United States viewed Indian tribes as inde-
pendent international entities prior to 1871. The fact that treaties
between the Indian tribes of the United States dealt with such inter-
national concerns as war powers, boundary and frontier regulations,
passports, extradition, and regulations with third countries supports
this contention as well. 67
The 1871 rider can be interpreted to mean that the inherent Indian
right to treat "based upon a tribe's unextinguished sovereignty" was
terminated. 8 Although treaties were to remain in force subsequent to
the Appropriations Act, Congress had the right to abrogate the treaties
by virtue of the Supremacy Clause. 69 Both the elimination of treaty
making and the power to abrogate were components of Congress'
plenary power over the Indian nations. 70 Nevertheless, the doctrine of
plenary power was a self-serving creation of the United States govern-
ment. As such, it cannot be presumed to have ideologically eradicated
the inherent sovereignty of long-standing Indian nations. Plenary power,
a uniquely domestic formulation, is invalid under international law if
it is used to unilaterally revoke the sovereignty of a nation.
The termination of treaty making did not eliminate the "interna-
tional law underpinnings" of tribal sovereignty.71 History shows that
the House of Representatives sponsored the 1871 rider because of
64. Clinebell & Thomson, supra note 34, at 678.
65. Id. The Indian Appropriations Act of 1871 ended treaty making. Act of Mar.
3, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544, 566.
66. Note, The American Indian - Tribal Sovereignty and Civil Rights, 51 IowA
L. Rav. 654, 661 (1966) (citing U.S. REv. STAT. § 2079 (1875)).
67. CoHEN, supra note 32.
68. Note, supra note 66, at 661.
69. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2. The clause states that "[the] Constitution and the
Laws of the United States ... made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the land; ... ." Id. Since laws of the United States are coextensive with treaties,
United States laws enacted later in time which conflict with treaties will supersede them
as a matter of domestic law. As a matter of international law, however, a state may
be in violation of its international law obligations under pacta sunt servanda if it
abrogates a treaty. See Diggs v. Schultz, 470 F.2d 461, cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931
(1972).
70. Note, supra note 66, at 662.
71. Dario F. Robertson, Note, A New Constitutional Approach to the Doctrine of
Tribal Sovereignty, 6 Am. INDLAN L. Rv. 371, 383 (1978).
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discontent with its lack of participation in the ratification process. The
fact that this was a political act cuts against the idea that Congress
desired to impair tribal sovereignty.
72
The treaty-making era provides convincing evidence that many In-
dian tribes were considered foreign nations by both the United States
and the world community. 3 The Zuni Tribe may be included amongst
the Indian foreign nations because it too has a history of treaty making.
On November 20, 1846, Colonel Alexander W. Doniphan met with
representatives of the Navajo bands and Zuni leaders and signed a
treaty of peace at Bear Springs.74 Then on August 8, 1850, Zuni Tribe
representatives signed the Pueblo Treaty of Agent James S. Calhoun.
75
This treaty is most significant because it promised "protection of tribal
land as well as sovereignty." 76 Modem Zuni tribal sovereignty therefore
derives from retained inherent sovereignty.
How Sovereignty of Indian Tribes Is Viewed in Later Case Law
Analysis of later case law reveals an absence of consistency in the
Court's treatment of tribal sovereignty. This inconsistency, at least in
part, reflects erratic changes in official federal policy toward the Indian
tribes. Although it is difficult to extract a coherent theme, the later
case law may be conceptualized as divided into two major categories:
(1) cases where the underlying presumption is that tribes possess in-
herent sovereignty and (2) cases where tribal sovereignty is attributable
to federal plenary power. Two important nineteenth century cases
demonstrate these conflicting themes.
In Ex parte Crow Dog,7 the Supreme Court in 1883 faced the
question of whether a federal court could exercise jurisdiction over an
Indian who murdered another Indian of the same tribe. To resolve
this issue, the Court analyzed whether an 1877 agreement and an 1868
treaty with the Sioux Indians effectively repealed an earlier statute
which indicated that crimes of one Indian against another were not
subject to federal law28 Construing the treaty narrowly, the Court
held that the treaty was not meant to permit or require "delivering
72. Id. at 383-84.
73. Under international law, one had to evaluate whether a particular tribe possessed
the requisite international components of statehood in order to determine if that tribe
could be considered a state. The components include a stable population, territory,
government, and the ability to enter into relations with other nations. See infra text
accompanying notes 130-67.
74. A Chronology of the History of the Zuni Tribe, ZUNI HISTORY, VICTORIES IN
THE 11990s (Inst. NorthAmerican West & Zuni Archaeology Program, Zuni, N.M.),
1991, § I, at 16.
75. Id.
76. Id. (emphasis added).
77. 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
78. Intercourse Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729.
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up" Indian wrongdoers of the same tribe as the victim. 79 Generally,
Crow Dog is cited for the proposition that Indian tribes as "distinct
political bodies" ought to be able to "regulate their own domestic
affairs... by administration of their own laws and customs." ' 0 Crow
Dog represents an effort by the Court to maintain tribal sovereignty.
In contrast, the Supreme Court in United States v. Kagama,8' decided
only three years later, demonstrated little regard for the doctrine of
inherent tribal sovereignty. The Court upheld the application of the
Major Crimes Act 2 which was passed as a reaction to the outcome in
Crow Dog. The Act justified federal court jurisdiction over an Indian
who committed certain enumerated major crimes against another even
if that crime took place within Indian country.
The United States Constitution provided justification for the Court's
position. If Indian nations were truly foreign nations, there would be
no need for a separate reference to them in the Commerce Clause.
3
The Court concluded the tribes were not foreign nations and thus were
"under the political control and geographical limits of the United
States." 4 The prevailing view was that political subdivisions derived
from or were in subordination to the United States government or the
states. The opinion states, "[tihe territorial governments owe all their
powers to the statutes of the United States conferring on them the
powers which they exercise, and which are liable to be withdrawn,
modified, or repealed at any time by Congress." 8S Thus, Kagama
dispensed with the idea that tribes possessed inherent power. Instead,
the power was viewed as deriving from the federal government. Ka-
gama represented the imposition of broad federal plenary power over
the tribes.
The Ex parte Crow Dog theme of inherent sovereignty reemerged
in a significant twentieth century case, United States v. Wheeler.86 In
1978, the Supreme Court held that the double jeopardy clause did not
apply to bar a Navajo from being prosecuted in federal court even
though he had already been tried, convicted and punished by a tribal
court. The Court determined that the Navajo Tribe was an independent
sovereign whose authority to prosecute arose from its inherent, retained
79. Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 567.
80. Id. at 568.
81. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
82. Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (codified at 18 U.S.C. 1153
(1976)).
83. The relevant provision states: "The Congress shall have Power ... to regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 2.
84. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 379.
85. Id. at 379-80.
86. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
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sovereignty, not from a grant of power from the federal government.
7
Federal plenary power continued to occupy a place in Indian law
jurisprudence as well. This theme resurfaced in 1978, in Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe." The Court reiterated the Kagama view that
tribes are under the "political control of the government of the United
States" and held that native tribal courts did not have inherent criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians for acts done on the reservation absent
specific authorization by Congress.89 The Court emphasized that the
incorporation of tribes into the federal system resulted in the divestiture
of certain inherent tribal powers. °
Some cases do not fit neatly into one or the other of the delineated
categories. The court's view on sovereignty in a particular case can be
unclear. 9' Nevertheless, discussing the later case law in this framework
helps to elucidate the differences in ideology,
Current Status of Indian Sovereignty - Can Tribes Be States?
What remains of the inherent sovereign powers of Indian tribes
today? In capsule form, tribes have the power to determine and form
.97. Id. at 328; see, e.g., McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164
(19711). Here, the Court declared it unacceptable for a state to tax an Indian for wages
earned on a reservation. It reiterated the idea that Indian tribal sovereignty is inherent,
though tribal sovereignty is subject to limitations such as "where essential tribal relations
were not involved and where the rights of Indians would not be jeopardized." Id. at
171 (quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219 (1959)). The Court stated that it had
held that the "question has always been whether the state's attempt to tax the plaintiff
'infringed on the right of Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them," Id.
at 181; see also Williams, 358 U.S. at 223 (the Court held a tribe may regulate, through
taxation, licensing, or other means, non-Indians who have commercial dealings with the
tribe or its members).
88. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
89. Id. at 211-12.
SO. Id. at 208-09; see also United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975). In
Mazurie, the Supreme Court upheld the right of the Wind River Reservation tribes to
control liquor sales on the reservation pursuant to congressional delegation of this
legislative power. The Court stated that the tribes "possess a certain degree of inde-
pendent authority over matters that affect the internal and social relations of tribal
life." Id. at 557. Although Mazurie appeared to be supportive of Indian sovereignty,
in reality, it was not. The decision depended on the supremacy of federal plenary power
over inherent tribal sovereignty.
91. See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, reh'g denied, 452 U.S. 911
(1981). In this case, the Supreme Court disallowed tribal regulation of non-Indian fishing
on non-Indian owned fee land within a reservation absent some direct effect on tribal
intere;ts such as "the political integrity, the economic security or the health or welfare
of the tribe." Id. at 566. The holding depended in large part on a finding that ownership
of the river bed did not pass to the Crow Tribe in treaties creating the reservation. The
inference to be drawn from the case is that the Crows would have had authority to
regulate fishing on non-Indian fee land had they been found to own the river bed.
However, it is unclear whether the Court would have relied on a doctrine of tribal
inherent authority or delegated authority to reach that outcome.
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their own style of government without having to adhere to the require-
ments of the Federal Constitution.92 Tribes can generally determine
their own membership in their capacity as "distinct political commu-
nities." 93 Tribes can promulgate civil and criminal laws and have
extensive power over domestic affairs and tribal property. Tribes have
taxing power. Tribes can create and operate their own judicial systems
subject to the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA).94 Tribes may exclude
people from tribal territory as a means to protect the "integrity and
order" of the territory and the "welfare" of their members. Lastly,
tribes maintain some power over non-Indians but this power is carefully
circumscribed by Congress and interpretive case law. 95
The tribes no longer have the power to: (1) transfer tribal land
absent federal approval; (2) enter into relations with other foreign
nations besides the United States;96 (3) regulate non-Indians when there
is no justifying tribal interest; and (4) subject non-Indians to criminal
jurisdiction. 97
It cannot be emphasized enough that the divestiture of inherent
tribal sovereignty described in the preceding summary, is a result of
the United States' policy of federal plenary power. Under international
law, this doctrine will not affect otherwise valid state status. Indian
tribes that possess vestigial inherent sovereignty and fulfill current
requirements of statehood are states under international law.
The Zuni Tribe Is a Cultural Sovereign State
The Zuni Tribe is a limited "cultural" state entitled to partake in
the rights and obligations of international law. 98 As previously stated,
a tribe is a sovereign entity to the extent that it possesses retained,
inherent power. If one can show that concern for cultural matters falls
within the tribe's inherent sovereignty and that control in this area has
not been removed by statute or treaty, then one can conclude that the
relevant tribe is a cultural sovereign state. 9
92. CoHEN, supra note 32, at 247.
93. Id. at 248. One caveat here is that Congress may legislate with respect to certain
aspects of membership such as descent and distribution, and eligibility for allotments.
94. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1988).
95. COHEN, supra note 32, at 248-57.
96. As will be shown later in this paper, Indian tribes have the capacity to enter
into foreign relations but cannot do so because the United States forbids this activity.
This proscription violates international law. See infra text accompanying notes 148-52.
97. COHEN, supra note 32, at 245-46.
98. For a reference to this theme, see Boyd, supra note 13, at 923-24. A limited
cultural state would not necessarily be able to partake of all international rights and
obligations; however, it would be justified in subscribing to those international laws
that specifically pertain to cultural matters.
99. Although federal plenary power may not be viable under international law, it
is worthwhile to address this doctrine since it is a component of United States Indian
law. Showing that inherent control over cultural matters has not been removed by treaty
or statute strengthens the argument for a cultural independent nation.
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Cultural concerns fall into the area of retained inherent sovereignty
because they constitute an essential tribal interest.'00 The Zuni War
Gods and the related repatriation effort may either be classified as a
religious or cultural concern since Zuni culture and religion are virtually
indistinguishable. 0' Regardless of classification, the War Gods play a
paramount role in Zuni life.e 2c Because repatriation of the War Gods
is a cultural concern, it constitutes an essential tribal interest by
inclusion. As such, it is a matter over which the Zuni Tribe exercises
sovereignty.
Cultural sovereignty has not been extinguished by statute or treaty.
In Fact, Congress has expressed its concern for Native American
cultural matters by enacting new legislation which supports the return
of cultural and religious icons. Although there is controversy over the
interest of museums and scientists in preserving Indian artifacts for
research and education, these interests have not led to action divesting
tribes of jurisdiction over their own cultural concerns. 103
The argument for Zuni cultural statehood is logical and reasonable
as slated, but further analysis is in order. It is necessary to determine
whether the concept of cultural statehood will pass muster under
international law. The answer lies in how the world community re-
sponds to the Zuni demand that it is entitled to national status on a
limited basis. The Zunis' claim to statehood in international law would
amount to a proclamation of a new custom and practice. 104 If the
international community accepts the novel claim, then opponents of
repatriation will have to contend with the Zunis under international
law, which states a custom and practice of return of cultural objects."'
Custom as a Source of International Law and How New Custom
and Practice Is Developed
In making the assertion that it is a state for cultural purposes, the
Zuni Tribe would be attempting to create new customary international
100. See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, reh'g denied, 452 U.S. 911
(1981); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973), for the
proposition that tribal sovereignty exists to the extent that essential tribal interests are
involved in a matter.
101. Religion plays such a major role in Zuni life that one might say religious
observance defines the culture. See infra note 102.
102. The Zunis believe that the War Gods are essential to the spiritual well-being
of the tribe. They protect the village, the Zuni way of life and indeed the world. They
are made "with prayers for the good intention, prosperity, safety, and harmony of the
whole world and universe." Charles Hustito, Why Zuni War Gods Need To Be Returned,
Zum Hisroay, VicTolms iN TH1990s (Inst. NorthAmerican West & Zuni Archaeology
Program, Zuni, N.M.), 1991, § II, at 12.
103. It is not within the scope of this paper to address this complicated area. See
Boyd, supra note 13, for an excellent recitation of the issues involved.
104. There is no preexisting custom dealing with limited statehood in international
law.
105. See infra text accompanying notes 191-267.
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law. In essence, the Zuni Tribe would be making a demand on the
world community justified by the Zuni vital state interest in being able
to secure the return of the War Gods. Whether or not the Zunis would
succeed in creating a new custom could be determined only by the
world's reaction to the novel claim of cultural statehood. If the world
acquiesced to this claim, then the Zunis could take advantage of
whatever international law is relevant to the return of cultural icons
to sovereign nations.'06 It may very well be that this limited demand
would be accepted in an atmosphere of global warming toward cultural
concerns.
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice cites
four major sources of international law to which the Court refers in
respiving disputes. These sources are
a. international conventions, whether general or particular,
establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting
states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice
accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
and
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions
and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of
the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determi-
nation of rules of law.107
In the eighteenth century, Vattel defined the "customary law of
nations" as "certain maxims and customs consecrated by long use,
and observed by nations in their mutual intercourse with each other
as a kind of law."'' 0 Today, international custom in its traditional
form is defined as a consistent practice which has been followed over
an extended period of time by the nations of the world. Countries
must follow the practice because they believe it to be required by law.
For the practice to constitute customary international law, it must be
106. One potentially problematic conceptual difficulty is whether the Zuni Tribe
could make a claim to statehood under the rubric of customary international law
creation without already being a state. The "demands" which evolve into customary
international law are ordinarily made by states. See infra text accompanying notes 110-
14. Obviously, the Tribe could never assert a unique claim to statehood if it needed to
be a state prior to that assertion. There is no indication under international law that
the Zunis could not make their declaration. We would have to wait to find out how
the world would react to this untested assertion.
107. United Nations Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945,
59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993, art. 38.
108. EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, OR PRINCIPLES op THE LAW OF
NATURE, APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS oF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS iXV (James
Brown Scott ed., 1797), quoted by JAms, supra note 61, at 36.
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followed by many members of the world community, though universal
acquiescence is not mandatory.'09
The concept of customary international law formation has evolved
to fit the needs of a fast-changing world. According to Professor
Myres McDougal, custom can emerge not only from a time honored
practice but also quickly and expediently in response to the exigencies
of modern realities.
10
To illustrate the concept of "modern" creation of custom and
practice, Professor McDougal looked at the circumstances surrounding
the hydrogen bomb tests conducted by the United States off the Pacific
Islands in the 1950s. Various commentators attacked the legality of
the tests under international law."' For example, Dr. Emanuel Margolis
stated that the 400,000-mile warning area required by the tests inter-
fered with the "international law principle of freedom of the seas,"
the "freedom of navigation," and the "freedom from interference
with the lawful pursuit of maritime industries."" 2 McDougal countered
by explaining that in testing its weapons on open seas, the United
States was not violating but making a new demand on international
law. This demand was justified by an essential national interest, that
of developing modern weapons of self defense. Essentially the United
States was attempting to formulate a new custom which provided for
legal bomb testing on open seas. With reference to the international
law of the sea, McDougal stated this body of law was:
a process of continuous interaction of continuous demand
and response, in which the decision-makers of particular
nation states unilaterally put forward claims of the most
diverse and conflicting character ... and in which other
decision-makers, external to the demanding state and in-
cluding both national and international officials, weigh and
appraise these competing claims in terms of the interests of
the world community and of the rival claimants, and ulti-
mately accept or reject them. As such, it is a living, growing
law, grounded in the practices and sanctioning expectations
of nation-state officials, and changing as their demands and
expectations are changed by the exigencies of new interests
and technology and by other- continually evolving conditions
in the world arena." 3
109. BRowmim, supra note 48, at 5-7. An example of an international custom drawn
from United States case law is the practice of refraining from the capture of peaceful
fishing vessels as prizes of war. See The Paquete Habana,- 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
110. Myres S. McDougal, Editorial Comment: The Hydrogen Bomb Tests and the
International Law of the Sea, 49 AM. J. INT'L L. 356 (1955).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 356.




According to McDougal's analysis, the United States' use of the high
seas, justified by an essential national interest, constituted instanta-
neous creation of custom providing the world responded positively or
interested parties were silent regarding its actions."
4
McDougal cited another example of the process of quick creation
of custom in the 1951 Fisheries Case."' The United Kingdom com-
plained that the Norwegians wrongfully arrested British fishermen for
being in Norwegian territorial waters. The United Kingdom claimed
that Norway had delimited its fishery in violation of established inter-
national law by measuring the four mile breadth of its territorial sea
from the low-water mark of the skjaergaard instead of from perma-
nently dry land.1 1 6 The International Court of Justice found that
Norway's method of delimitation was lawful even though it was not
in line with widely accepted custom. In reaching its decision, the Court
took into account a variety of "policies, principles, precedents, anal-
ogies and considerations of fairness," including the economic interests
of the region.17 In summary, Norway made a claim (or demand) that
it was justified under international law in stating an alternative basis
for determining its territorial sea. After the International Court of
Justice's decision, the world community acquiesced. Thus, a new
custom was created as a result of Norway's unilateral claim based on
an essential national interest.
A final example of instantaneous custom creation is the United
Nations General Assembly's Declaration of Legal Principles Governing
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space. It has
been said this Declaration "was both the inspiration and the basic
framework for almost instantaneously created rules of international
law."1 18 The Declaration can be cited for the proposition that, "[i]f
the necessary consensus exists, a new principle may be accepted very
quickly."119
114. With regard to custom and practice, silence may indicate tacit agreement if the
party is an interested one. If the party is viewed as disinterested then its silence may
indicate a lack of acquiescence in the practice. BRowNUE, supra note 48, at 6.
115. Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116 (Dec. 18).
116. The skjaergaard or rock rampart is a chain of islands which is located off the
permanent coast of Norway. The Norwegians claimed it was unreasonable to measure
the territorial sea from the "permanent" coastline because it is so tortuous and broken
it would be impossible to apply the internationally accepted method of following each
indentation and curvature of the coast. Rather, Norway asserted that drawing a line
from the outer edge of the rock rampart was appropriate.
117. McDougal, supra note 110, at 359 n.10. The economic interest the court referred
to was the Norwegian reliance on the fishing industry as a means of livelihood. Norway
felt justified in making its unique claim to territorial waters because many of its citizens
living on the rocky coast and islands of the skjaergaard depended on fishing for
subsistence.
118. D.W. Gitmo, InhRNATioNAL LAW 19 (2nd ed. 1976).
119. Id.
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Two international disputes touch on the issue of whether Indian
tribes' claims of statehood are legally cognizable, the Cayuga Indians
Claims Case'2 and the Mohawk Nation Claim.'21 In the Cayuga Indians
Claims Case, brought before an international arbitration tribunal in
1926, Great Britain represented the Canadian Cayugas against the
United States for the United States' failure to pay annuities negotiated
by treaty. The tribunal found the claim was justiciable (at least in this
particular forum) but that the Indian tribe "[was] not a legal unit of
international law"' ' and that the Cayuga nation had no "international
status."I' The Mohawk Nation of the Grand River in Canada similarly
attempted to invoke the jurisdiction of an international tribunal, that
of the International Court of Justice, but the claim was dismissed for
failure to state a cause of action1 4
These cases suggest that international tribunals do not recognize
tribes as subjects of international law, but this outcome does not sound
the death knell for the Zunis' novel claim. First, the Cayuga and
Mohawk nations presented themselves before international tribunals as
fully endowed states. Under the proposed theory, the Zuni Tribe would
specifically identify itself as a limited state for cultural purposes only.
This lesser claim of statehood should be looked upon more favorably.
Second, both the Cayuga and Mohawk defeats may have been caused
by poor legal strategy. The claims might have been brought more
appropriately by the Six Nations Confederacy.12 Third, precedent does
not apply in the International Court of Justice; thus, the Court will
not be bound by past decisions if it is presented with a tribal claim
of statehood. 26 Certainly if the Court may review each new controversy
without the shackles of precedent, individual nations may do the same
in response to the Zuni demand.
Under the assumption that there is custom and practice covering the
return of cultural icons to a demanding state, the Zuni claim to
statehood might be accepted as consistent with the cultural deference
12A). Cayuga Indian Claims (Gr. Brit. v. U.S.), 6 R.I.A.A. 173, 20 Am J. INT'L L.
574 (1926).
12l. 0. Ghobashy, The Claim of the Mohawk Nation of the Grand River Under
the Haldimand Agreement (n.d.), cited in Judith L. Andress & James E. Falkowski,
Note, Self-Determination: Indians and the United Nations - The Anomalous Status of
America's "Domestic Dependent Nations," 8 AM. INn1 L. REv. 97, 108-09 n.96
(1980).
122. Robertson, supra note 71, at 385 (citing Cayuga Indian Claims, 6 R.I.A.A. at
173, 20 AM J. INT'L L. at 577).
123. Id. (citing Cayuga Indian Claims, 6 R.I.A.A. at 173, 20 AM. J. INT'L L. at
580).
124. Andress & Falkowski, supra note 121, at 108-09 n.96.





inherent in that custom. 27 Stated differently, the world community
might determine that it is desirable to allow entities like American
Indian tribes to benefit from cultural rights provided under interna-
tional law. Given that, this community may bestow special state status
on tribes.
Inspection of the record of War God repatriation in the United
States reveals an upsurge of "return" activity beginning in 1990.
Between 1978 and 1989, a total of twenty-six War Gods from fourteen
collections were returned to the Zunis. Since 1990, thirty-nine War
Gods from twenty collections were returned.12s This significant accel-
eration in repatriation activity may be partially attributable to the
newly developed custom. 29
Applying the previous discussion, the Zunis may be able to instan-
taneously create new customary international law if a number of states
accept its claim of cultural statehood.
127. This concept will be discussed at length. See infra text accompanying notes
191-266.
128. T.J. Ferguson, Return of War Gods Sets Example For Repatriation, ZUN
HISTORY, VICTORiS n imn 1990s (Inst. NorthAmerican West & Zuni Archaeology
Program, Zuni, N.M.), 1991, § II, at 13.
129. This point merits some qualification. The Zunis' well-organized plan to recover
all War Gods, in conjunction with supportive federal legislation, is largely responsible
for the successful repatriation effort in this country. Letter from T.J. Ferguson, supra
note 27. The suggestion that a "custom of return" may have positively influenced the
War God collectors to act affirmatively should not be interpreted as a trivialization or
denigration of the Zunis' work.
Attributing the positive response, in part, to the custom of return assumes that the
United States and its subjects view the Zuni Tribe as a sovereign cultural entity. This
assumption stands to reason because the international custom of return deals with the
interaction of states. I believe the United States has increasingly come to regard Indian
tribes as sovereign cultural entities. See, e.g., Johnson v. Chilkat Indian Village, 457
F.Supp. 384 (D. Alaska 1978). This case dealt with the issue of whether the plaintiff
(a Tlinget Indian) could sell ceremonial artifacts of the Tlinget tribe of Alaska to art
dealers or whether the objects were community property and thus inalienable. The court
held that any decision by a federal court would prejudice the Chilkat Indian Village
Council. It refused to adjudicate the case and referred it instead to the newly proposed
Tlingit tribal court system. The court found jurisdiction inappropriate because this
cultural dispute was an inherent tribal matter. The dismissal of this claim suggests that
the United States regarded the tribe as a sovereign nation, at least for cultural purposes.
See Clements, supra note 28, at 21. It should be noted, however, that a subsequent
action arising out of the same controversy, Chilkat Indian Village v. Johnson, 870 F.2d
1469 (9th Cir. 1989), was distinguished from the 1978 Chilkat action in that federal
jurisdiction is appropriate where the tribe is making a claim against a non-Indian. In
the later circuit court case, some of the defendants were non-Indians.
In order to validate that the United States is responsive to repatriation efforts because
of an emerging international custom, one must look at other examples of American
sensitivity to cultural concerns such as the return of Picasso's Guernica to Spain by the
Museum of Modern Art in New York City. See James M. Markham, Spain Says
Bienvenida to Picasso's 'Guernica,' N.Y. Timm, Sep. 11, 1981, at C19.
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The Zuni Tribe Is a Full-Fledged State Under International Law
In a provocative article, John Clinebell and John Thomson set forth
a theory that many American Indian tribes were originally and still
are sovereign, independent nations according to international law cri-
teria. 130 These otherwise sovereign states are unable to assert their
statehood because of restrictions imposed on them by the United States
in violation of international law. One of the authors' contentions is
that the United States' imposition of restrictions, as by force or threat
of force "do/es] not change the rights which native people are entitled
to exercise under [international] law."'' Certainly, if the Zuni Tribe
meets the international law criteria of full statehood it will be able to
base its repatriation efforts on international law.
The analysis will proceed by evaluating the Zuni Tribe under the
established elements of statehood. This comment will show that the
Zuni Tribe meets all four criteria of statehood: a defined territory, a
permanent population, a government, and a capacity to enter into
relations with other foreign states.11
2
The Zunis fulfill the territory requirement. Although the Zunis lost
much of their "pre-contact time" landholdings, they have a reservation
which was established in 1877 by executive order.' The land reserved
for the Zunis was insufficient to support an agrarian based economy
and, in a series of petitions, the Zuni government eventually secured
73,000 additional acres."" Subsequent to intensive governmental lob-
bying, the Zunis were able to facilitate the passage of the Zuni Salt
Lake Bill, which authorized the return of the Zuni Salt Lake to tribal
ownership. 3 Another bill was passed in 1984 which resulted in the
reversion of additional land to Zuni control. 3 6 Clearly the Zunis have
definite, recognized landholdings which constitute territory under in-
ternational law.
The Zunis have a permanent population characteristic of a "stable
community.' ' 3 7 They are a people "sufficient in number to maintain
and perpetuate [themselves]."'' Clinebell and Thomson suggest that
130. Clinebell and Thomson, supra note 34, at 669-70. The authors emphasize that
each tribe must be examined individually to evaluate its status under international law.
131. Id. at 671 (emphasis added).
132. Convention on Rights and Duties of States, art. 1, 49 Stat. 3097, T.S. No.
881, 3 Bevans 145, 165 L.N.T.S. 19 (entered into at Montevideo Dec. 26, 1933; effective
Dec. 26, 1934).
133. T.J. Ferguson, E. Richard Hart & Calbert Seciwa, Twentieth Century Zuni
Politicc'l And Economic Development In Relation To Federal Indian Policy, in PUBLIC
PoLIcY IMPAcTs ON AMERICAN INDIAN EcoNoMIc DEVELOPMENT 115 (C. Matthew Snipp
ed., 19.38) [hereinafter Zuni Development].
134. Id. at 115-16.
135. Act of May 15, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-280, 92 Stat. 244 (Zuni Salt Lake Bill).
136. Act of Aug. 28, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-408, 98 Stat. 1533; see Zuni Development,
supra note 133, at 131.
137. BROwNL, supra note 48, at 73.
138. Clinebell & Thomson, supra note 34, at 673 (citing I C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL
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Native Americans that managed to "survive and maintain their identity
in the face of the destructive policies of the United States government
*.. have permanent and durable populations." 13 9 The Zuni Tribe has
a thriving population of approximately ten thousand members. It has
the second largest population of all the Southwest Pueblos.14 There is
no doubt that the tribal members have maintained their Zuni cultural
identity despite certain concessions to American life, like adoption of
a constitutional government and participation in modern economic
development.
4'
The Zuni Tribe has a well defined, effective government. Govern-
ment is evidenced by centralized administrative and legislative bodies
designed to maintain a stable political community. 42 Governmental
structure can be traced back to pre-contact times when the Zunis were
ruled by religious leaders. This theocratic form of government existed
between 1539 and 1848 when the Zunis were governed by Spain,
followed by Mexico. It is believed that Spanish officials appointed a
religious leader as governor and that a council presided over the tribe
as well. A basic structure of government comprised of both superior
religious leaders and subordinate civil servants continued until after
the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) of 1934, when an IRA govern-
ment was first instituted.1
43
A Constitution of the Zuni Tribe was prepared and ratified in 1970
pursuant to the directives of the IRA. The constitution provided for
a reorganization of the tribal government into legislative, executive,
and judicial departments. Although this government emulates the
American model, the Zunis continue to maintain a religious component
of government by authorizing the head of the religious council to
install the governor and tribal council.
The legislative department consists of the governor, lieutenant gov-
ernor, six tribal councilmen elected at large, and a secretary. The tribal
council has a host of responsibilities including "negotiations with
federal, state, and local governments, protection and regulation of
tribal land and property, appropriation and administration of tribal
expenditures, and the enactment and enforcement of tribal ordi-
nances."1"
138. Clinebell & Thomson, supra note 34, at 673 (citing 1 C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL
LAw 16-17 (1st ed. 1922)).
139. Id. at 673.
140. Telephone Interview with Joseph Dishta, supra note 5.
141. Zuni Development, supra note 133.
142. Brownlie, supra note 48, at 73.
143. Zuni Development, supra note 133, at 114-22.
144. Id. at 126.
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The executive department consists of the governor, lieutenant gov-
ernor, and a tribal councilman who also serves as a treasurer. This
deipartment administers tribal programs. The governor also presides
over the council and appoints non-elected executive officials.
45
The judiciary consists of a chief judge and two associate judges.
Trial and appellate courts exert jurisdiction over all Indians on the
Zuni reservation as dictated in the "Tribal Law and Order Code.'
46
The fact that the Zuni tribal government is able to provide a
multitude of valuable services to the people is testimony to its effect-
ive:ness. As of 1988, seventy-one tribal programs provided for such
necessities as healthcare, education, public safety, and public works. 47
The Zuni Tribe clearly exhibits the requisite element of government
necessary to a finding of statehood in international law.
The fourth element of statehood, the capacity to enter into foreign
relations with other states, is the most difficult element to demonstrate.
Since 1871, the United States has refused to acknowledge tribal na-
tiorhood, to form treaties with the Indian tribes, or allow Indian tribes
to form treaties with foreign nations. Nevertheless, the American
prohibition on treaty making is inconsequential. If the Zunis are
capable of forming treaties and entitled to enter treaties under inter-
national law, then the crucial fourth element of statehood is fulfilled
despite official United States policy.
48
Arguably, the 1871 Act did not strip the tribes of their national
status or their rights to treat with other nations. As noted earlier, the
187. act was a product of a political battle between the Senate and
the House. The House resented being excluded from the treaty rati-
ficalion process and therefore facilitated passage of the bill. 49 Given
the gravity of the interests involved and the dubious origin of the 1871




147. Id. at 127-28. By no means does the text provide an exhaustive explication of
the Zuni Tribal government. The minimum information demonstrates that the major
elements of the Zuni government are in place.
1411. Treaty making and capacity to enter into foreign relations are used interchange-
ably in this section, however, it is arguable that treaty making is not a necessary
component of carrying on foreign relations. A striking example of tribal ability to carry
on foreign relations was recently demonstrated by the Sioux tribe. In December, 1990,
a delegation of seven tribal elders of the South Dakota Sioux tribe travelled to Iraq to
pray and offer their peace pipe to the Iraqi president, Saddam Hussein. The emissaries
went to Iraq at the invitation of the Iraqi government. See Sioux Pray in Iraq Capital,
L.A. Timm, Dec. 4, 1990, at A6.
149. See supra text accompanying note 72.
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The blanket prohibition against tribal treaty making violates inter-
national law:.10 If, for example, the Zunis attempted to execute a treaty
with Spain, this act would threaten affront the authority of the United
States. The federal government would certainly issue warnings to the
tribe to cease and desist from this unprecedented, illegal activity. If
the tribe persisted in its course of action, economic sanctions and
federal plenary power might be invoked to deprive the tribe of what
sovereign powers it possessed. An unspoken but real possibility exists
that physical or military force would be used to constrain unacceptably
assertive tribal activity. The fact that the United States has the might
to economically or militarily subjugate the Zuni nation under the
hypothetical situation posited, does not nullify the tribe's ability to
carry on foreign relations."'
The Zunis are capable of carrying on relations with foreign nations.
The Zuni Tribe consists of a cohesive, well defined people with a
highly developed, functional government and capable representatives.
The tribal religious and civil leaders have demonstrated powers of
persuasion, negotiation, and diplomacy. These skills are illustrated by
the Zunis' amazing success in facilitating the repatriation of the War
Gods without having to resort to litigation. Zuni success in congres-
sional lobbying for special legislation is additional evidence that the
tribe possesses the necessary political know-how and savvy to carry on
relations with foreign entities . 52 Clinebell and Thomson stated:
Native Americans have the skills and experience necessary
to act in the international community. The desire and need
to protect their rights, resources and authority has led them
to develop expertise in business, law, government and di-
plomacy with which they can quite adequately protect their
interests at the international level. Superiority in force of
arms and physical strength is no longer a valid means,
under international law, for interfering with one state's
international political status."3
The U.N. Charter stipulates that "[all Members shall refrain in
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."'
4
150. The prohibition violates international law if it is backed up by the potential
use of force. See infra text accompanying notes 153-54.
151. Clinebell & Thomson, supra note 34, at 678-79.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 135-36.
153. Clinebell & Thomson, supra note 34, at 679 (citations omitted, emphasis added).
154. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4, reprinted in LELAND M. GOODRICH, EDVARD
HAMBRO & ANNE P. SIMONS, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMENTARY AND
DOCUMENTS 43 (3d ed. 1969).
No. 2]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1992
614 AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW [Vol. 17
Although the United States under domestic law can legally deny the
Zuni Tribe the right to engage foreign nations in political discourse,
it is not entitled to do so under international law. A denial of the
Zuni right is a violation of international law under the U.N. Charter
if this denial is predicated on the threat of force. If after'a factual
inquiry, all the elements of statehood are present, states have a legal
obligation under international law to recognize another entity's state-
hood in good faith. One state cannot decline to recognize another
state because of political reasons. 155 If the Zuni Tribe fulfills the
elements of statehood, the United States is obligated to grant recog-
nition.
Clinebell and Thomson point out that a state may associate with
another state without surrendering sovereignty.' 516 Opponents of Indian
sovereignty argue that the treaty making process resulted in relinquish-
ment of tribal sovereignty in exchange for protection by the United
States government. Supposedly, contemporary relationships between
the tribes and the government reinforce the "concept of voluntary
mer;ger." 57 For example, today tribes accept the benefits bestowed on
them by federal recognition. 5' Tribes have modeled their tribal gov-
ernments on American models and have fashioned tribal affairs in
accordance with American law. Indians are American citizens. Inter-
national law contradicts the claim that Indian sovereignty has been
extinguished by this close association. Vattel stated the general rule:
The conditions of ... unequal alliance may be infinitely
varied. But whatever they are, provided the inferior ally
reserve to itself the sovereignty, or the right of governing
its own body, it ought to be considered as an independent
state, that keeps up an intercourse with others under the
authority of the law of nations. 59
As long as the Zuni Tribe continues to think of itself and act as a
sovereign state it cannot be considered absorbed by the United States
even though it accepts the benefits bestowed by the federal government.
Vattel's statement is upheld by modern practice. There are a number
of states which have surrendered some of their functions to larger,
more diversified states yet continue to exist as separate entities. An-
dorra., Liechtenstein, Monaco, and San Marino are numbered among
155. BROWNLIE, supra note 48, at 92.
156. Clinebell & Thomson, supra note 34, at 692.
157. Id. at 692.
158. The term "recognition" as used here refers to recognition of a particular Native
American group as a tribe, not as a state.
159. Id. (citing EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, OR PRINCIPLES OF THE
LAW OF NATURE, APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIONS
bk. 1, at 5 (J. Chitty trans. 1852) (Ist ed. Neuchatel 1758)).
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these special states.'6 Liechtenstein, for example, entrusts its foreign
relations and economic interests to Switzerland. Although Liechtenstein
was denied membership in the League of Nations in 1920, it was
allowed to become a party to the Statute of the International Court
of Justice.16' In the 1955 Nottebohm case,'Q the International Court
of Justice did not treat Liechtenstein any differently from other states
in determining whether states' nationality statutes are recognized by
other states "for the purposes of the rule of nationality of claims.'
'63
San Marino, not unlike the Zuni Tribe, is under the general protec-
tion of a larger state (Italy). San Marino treats with other states and
is also a party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice.'6
Although there is delegation of some of the "microstate" 16s functions
to larger entities, these states are nonetheless generally thought of as
sovereigns under the authority of their own governments.'1
In the last few decades a number of former colonies have gained
independence. These microstates such as Gambia and the Maldive
Islands have secured admission to the United Nations. One United
States representative to the Security Council has suggested that finan-
cially struggling, newly independent states should be given only asso-
ciate membership in the United Nations because of the inability to
contribute adequately to the organization. Despite this suggestion, no
one has raised the issue before the General Assembly because of the
anticolonialist sentiment favoring independence. The United Nations
as an international body favors full membership even if a state dep-
utizes another state to carry out certain functions. This full membership
consolidates and affirms the fledgling state's statehood. 67
In summary, international law presumes that entities are states even
if they delegate certain functions. This holds true as long as the four
criteria of statehood are met. This presumption in favor of statehood
supports the contention that the Zuni Tribe is a state under interna-
tional law. The Zuni Tribe might be well advised to seek full mem-
bership in the United Nations to gain recognition for its status.
160. GREIG, supra note 118, at 95.
161. Id. The Committee on Admissions of the League of Nations denied Liechtenstein
admission because of a concern that it would be unable to carry out its obligations
under the League Covenant. The concern derived from Liechtenstein's act in delegating
some of its powers to Switzerland. The League indicated, however, that its decision had
no bearing on Liechtenstein's status as a sovereign state.
162. Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.) 1955 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 6).
163. GREIo, supra note 118, at 95.
164. Id. at 96.
165. Id. at 95. Microstates are defined as very small territorial units. Some Native
American tribes are not microstates, a fact that strengthens their position.
166. Id. at 97.
167. Id. at 96-97.
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An Option to Immediate Statehood - A United States Trust
Agreement with the United Nations
If the Zuni Tribe is unable to assert its statehood, it might elect to
petition the United States government to enter into a trust agreement
with the United Nations on its behalf. Article 76 of the U.N. Charter
outlines a trusteeship system whereby an administering nation agrees
to place a territory under a trusteeship system in order to facilitate
"international accountability for the welfare of the territory's native
inhabitants.' ' 16s What is central to the Zuni concern is that this trus-
teeship arrangement is designed "to promote the political, economic,
social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust
territories, and their progressive development towards self-government
or ,ndependence as may be appropriate."' 69 Thus, if the Zuni Tribe
cannot presently gain international recognition for its statehood, its
only alternative may be to put itself on an "independence track" via
a trusteeship arrangement. 170
If the United States were willing to enter into a trust agreement with
the United Nations, then the tribe might be able to call itself a subject
of international law and thus be able to utilize international law to
support the repatriation effort. It is unclear whether simple membership
in the trusteeship system (versus achievement of full independence)
would enable the tribe to make international legal claims. As a general
rule, the entity in question must be a state in order for it to make a
legally cognizable claim under international law. One possible exception
to this rule is where the relevant law specifically addresses nonstates,
such as indigenous peoples. This can be seen in the context of inter-
national human rights law.)
Problems remain with the trusteeship system. The United States
wou]ld most probably be very reluctant to acquiesce to such an ar-
rangement because it would ultimately require a relinquishment of
territory and control over the domestic dependent nations. It is pos-
sible, however, that the United States' views on this subject may evolve.
169. Andress & Falkowski, supra note 121, at 110. It has been suggested that Indian
tribes could appropriately be brought into a trusteeship arrangement under the category
of "territories voluntarily placed under the system by states responsible for their
administration." Id. at 109 n.100 (citing U.N. CHARTER art. 77).
169. U.N. CHARTR art. 76(b) (emphasis added).
171). A state's technical existence does not guarantee its recognition by the interna-
tional community. Andress & Falkowsi, supra note 121, at 108. According to the
"declaratory" doctrine of recognition, however, the "legal effects of recognition are
limited, since recognition is a mere declaration or acknowledgement of an existing state
of law and fact, legal personality having been conferred previously by operation of
law." BROWU E, supra note 48, at 88-89. Also, international law stipulates that states
cannot fail to recognize for political reasons. See supra text accompanying note 155.
171. See infra text accompanying notes 176-82.
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At some point, it may be in this country's best interest to divest itself
of financial and legal responsibility for at least some tribes. Money
earmarked for Indian affairs may be better spent on other domestic
concerns. Of course, if the United States chooses to divest itself of
responsibility for certain tribes, trusteeship may be unnecessary. The
world may be more willing to view the Zuni Tribe as a sovereign state
if the United States abandons its protest to that status. This approach
to making the tribe a subject of international law is not ideal, but all
avenues should be explored to achieve the desired goal.
One Interim Consideration - Does a Tribe Really Have To Be a
State to Benefit from International Law?
Before moving on to the second major concern of this comment it
should be noted that other authors do not view international person-
ality as a prerequisite to asserting an international law claim. In fact,
author Rebecca Clements approached this issue from the opposite
vantage point. Essentially Clements reasoned that native peoples' abil-
ity to make a claim for restitution strengthens their claim to cultural
sovereignty. 72 She stated, "The power to regain lost cultural property
is the first step toward political self-determination. 173 Although self-
determination does not necessarily lead to "autonomous aboriginal
states" within the dominant, larger state, coniplete sovereignty is
certainly a choice of the relevant people. 74 Hence, according to Cle-
ments' argument, a tribe may actually facilitate its ascent to statehood
by making a claim. This is quite different from the argument that a
tribe must be a state prior to asserting an international law claim.
7
In articulating her views, Clements looked to a discrete body of
law, international human rights. International human rights law, unlike
many other areas of international law, specifically addresses the rights
172. Clements, supra note 28, at 3.
173. Id. at 4.
174. Id.
175. If Clements is right, then American Indian tribes such as the Zunis would have
a lower burden of proof to bring their return claims to the forefront. Under the
Clements theme, all the Zunis would have to show is that they are a "people," (people
being a term of art in international human rights doctrine). Id. at 4-5. Of course, the
precise meaning of "people" is oft disputed but it has been authoritatively defined as
a "social entity, possessing a clear identity and its own characteristics." Id. at 5. There
must be a relationship between the people and a territory, and a people is not an
"ethnic, religious or linguistic minority]." Id.; see Clements, supra note 28, at 4-5
(citing Delia Opekokew, International Law, International Institutions and Indigenous
Issues, in THE RiGHTs OF INDIGENOUs PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: SELECTED ESSAYs
IN SELF-DETERmATION 1, 4 (Ruth Thompson ed., 1987)). The Zuni tribe qualifies as
a people. See supra text accompanying notes 137-41. The international law agreements
discussed in the next section primarily refer to "states," not "peoples," therefore it is
still important to establish the Zuni tribe as a state.
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of aboriginal peoples; thus, statehood in this particular area is not
essential to reap the law's benefits.
After reviewing documents including the U.N.'s 1948 Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights, 176 the 1960 Declaration on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Territories and Peoples,'7 and the 1966
Declaration of the Principles of International Cultural Co-operation,'
Clements concluded that "cultural identity is a necessary component
of human dignity" to which all peoples are entitled under international
law.' 79 Thus, an indigenous people would be entitled to demand the
return of cultural objects because possession of the objects is necessary
to the maintenance of a cultural identity.
Adthough he does not deal with tribal claims for cultural property,
student note writer Christopher Cline, like Clements, has suggested
that Indian tribes can seek redress for human rights violations under
international law.1s° Cline examined the outcome in Lyng v. Northwest
Indian Cemetery Protective Association.'8 1 In this case, the United
States Supreme Court upheld the Forest Service's right to build a
logging road through sacred Indian country even though building the
1'76. G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., pt. I, at 71, Resolutions, U.N.
Doc. A/810 (1948).
177. G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66, U.N.
Doc. A/4684 (1961).
178. Clements, supra note 28 (citing UNESCO, CuLtuAL Rsozrrs As HuuAN RioHrs
(1970), reprinted in UNESCO, SiTruns A"D DocumENTS ON CULTURAL Poucy bk. 3
(1970)).
179. Clements, supra note 28, at 4. The application of international human rights
principles to indigenous peoples reflects current policy as indicated by the proliferation
of de 'arations and writings on this topic. One of the most recent statements to emerge
is the United Nations Subcommission Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/sub.2/1991/36 (June 12, 1991). See also The Draft Inter-
national Covenant on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, in U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/
AC.4/1983/5, at 13. One of the articles of this document specifically provides for
restitution of cultural property to indigenous peoples. The relevant language is as follows:
Indigenous People have the right to reacquire possession of significant
cultural artifacts presently in the possession of public or semi-public in-
stitutions, where possession of those artifacts was not obtained from the
Indigenous People in a just and fair manner or where the artifacts are of
major cultural or religious significance to the Indigenous People.
Id. This Covenant by definition only requires the claimant to be an indigenous people.
Statehood is not necessary to confer rights. For further discussion of cultural property
protection in the context of international human rights law, see Dinah Shelton, Inter-
nation al Protection of Indigenous Peoples' Culture and Cultural Property, in TAE Riosrrs
OF INDoIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: SELECTED ESSAYS IN Sarr-DaTRMNA-
noN 47 (Ruth Thompson ed., 1987).
180. Christopher P. Cline, Note, Pursuing Native American Rights in International
Law Venues: A Jus Cogens Strategy After Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
Association, 42 HAsTiNs L.J. 591 (1991).
181. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
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road would have a devastating effect on the ability of three tribes to
exercise their religious rites. Cline argued that the "prejudicial insen-
sitivity to Native American religions ... constitute[d] a violation of
the Tribes' rights to maintain their religion and culture that could be
characterized as a denial of self-determination, an act of apartheid
and ultimately cultural genocide."' ' Because these egregious acts are
human rights violations under various international law conventions,
the tribes alleged these violations before the Organization of American
States' Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. Cline has rec-
ommended that tribes utilize the precepts and remedies available under
international human rights law when violations occur. Significantly,
under Cline's approach, the tribe does not need to be a state to make
an international law claim.
Clements' and Cline's arguments must be put in context. Native
peoples can make claims under international law only to the extent
that declarations and conventions provide positive entitlements specif-
ically intended for these peoples. International standing in one narrowly
defined area (human rights) does not enable a nonstate indigenous
people to rely on law that only applies to states. A significant body
of state-state international conventions and custom outside interna-
tional human rights has grown up around the practice of returning
important cultural property. A tribe would be unable to recover under
this law without first establishing state status.
This comment now addresses the second major concern. What is
the international law which specifically governs the repatriation of
cultural property?
Under International Customary Law, States Are Entitled to the
Return of Objects of the Cultural Patrimony
As previously discussed, the Zuni Tribe would have to utilize "mod-
ern" customary international law creation in order to validate the
assertion that it is a "cultural" sovereign nation. This modern custom-
ary law creation would be necessary because there is no long-standing
or "traditional" international custom which establishes the right of an
indigenous people to declare itself a limited, cultural state.183 In this
section, we deal with an issue for which there is an established custom.
Traditional customary international law dictates that one state has a
legal obligation to return cultural property to another state when the
property comprises part of the claimant state's cultural patrimony.
Before presenting documentary evidence of the alleged custom, it is
necessary to define the elements of traditional customary international
law.
182. Cline, supra note 180, at 593-94.
183. See supra text accompanying notes 104-06.
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To show international custom, one must demonstrate that there is
a consistently engaged in practice. This practice need not be completely
uniform, but there must be a "generality of [the particular] practice"
among states.'1 It is not enough to show a very limited number of
states engage in the practice. On the other hand, universality of practice
is not required. If the majority of the world community engages in a
given practice but some states abstain, this abstention will not strike
down what is otherwise a valid source of international law."' This
non-universality allowance will be important to remember when we
look at the case of the Elgin Marbles where Great Britain diverges
from a widely practiced custom of return.
It is unclear exactly how long it takes for a practice to develop into
law but the practice must be of some significant duration. The duration
of the practice may change according to the circumstances but does
not have to be "immemorial" for law to have evolved. 8 6 Of course,
the passage of time will serve as evidence of the "generality and
consistency" of the practice.8 7 States must perceive that the particular
practice they engage in is "obligatory" or is "required by or consistent
witlh prevailing international law."'8 States must act out of a sense of
legal obligation as opposed to a sense of comity or courtesy.1'9
Evidence of custom can be found in a variety of places. These
include: policy statements, state legislation, international and national
judicial decisions, recitals in treaties and other international instru-
ments, and a pattern of treaties in the same form.'90
The elements that comprise a custom in international law are satisfied
with respect to the topic of cultural repatriation. A consistent practice
exists whereby nations return cultural objects to other sovereign nations,
particularly if the objects are precious and were illegally transferred.
The practice has gone on for a considerable period of time, at least
sinc. World War II. The practice is widespread. 19' Many documented
individual cases of return and numerous multilateral and bilateral
conventions attest to the generality of the practice.
A generalized sentiment abounds that return is required by law. The
evidence of the custom of return can be found in a number of sources.
These include international conventions, regional agreements, recom-
mendations by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Orgamization (UNESCO), General Assembly resolutions, bilateral trea-
184. Brownlie, supra note 48, at 5.
185. Id. at 5-6.




190. Id. at 5.
191. See infra text accompanying notes 195-266.
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ties, and national legislation schemes.'9 There are also numerous well-
documented examples of return by countries from every legal system
in the world. The fact that the practice of return is in effect codified
in the conventions supports the view that states believe their acts are
required. In fact, to some degree the "elements of custom" analysis
is superfluous because the very existence of lawmaking treaties and in
this case bilateral treaties creates a presumption that there is a legally
binding custom to which states must adhere. This is even true with
respect to nonsignatory states.
Some treaties are in principle binding only on parties, but
the number of parties, the explicit acceptance of rules of
law, and, in some cases, the declaratory nature of the
provisions produce a strong law-creating effect at least as
great as the general practice considered sufficient to support
a customary rule. 93
In effect, the treaties resemble a kind of "legislation by the whole
community of States" or a codification of custom. 94
For the sake of academic thoroughness, the author now discusses
the origins of the custom of return and examine some of the docu-
mentation that supports the existence of the custom. The number and
diversity of states that are party to international conventions on return
supports the idea that these conventions are evidence of generalized
customary international law. The examination of whether a custom
exists will begin by reviewing wartime policy statements and documents.
Conventions and Statements in the Wartime Context
Although the subject matter at hand is the return of cultural property
under peacetime circumstances, much of the history of the disposition
of cultural property is found in the context of war. It is clear from
the substance of wartime conventions that states accorded cultural
property a certain degree of deference. While dealing with the general
matter of preservation of cultural property, many wartime conventions
also addressed the issue of what would happen to the property upon
termination of international hostilities.
Prior to the Second World War, the inviolability of cultural property
was not absolute. During wartime in the middle ages, conquering
armies had no compunction when it came to pillaging and plundering
the cultural property of conquered states. 95 The victor claimed title to
192. For the most part, national legislation schemes provide only indirect evidence
of the custom. See infra text accompanying notes 250.55.
193. BROWNUE, supra note 48, at 12-14 (emphasis added).
194. Id. at 12 n.63 (citations omitted).
195. Gael M. Graham, Protection and Reversion of Cultural Property: Issues of
Definition and Justification, 21 INT'L LAw. 755, 756-57 (1987). There was a general
lack of respect for cultural property with the exception of religious artifacts.
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whatever property it desired. This practice continued more or less
unchanged until the eighteenth century when Vattel determined that
conquering forces could claim property only to the extent necessary
"to conduct military operations, exact indemnification or establish a
secure peace."' 96 In addition, seventeenth- and eighteenth-century trea-
ties alluded to an increased willingness of nations to return cultural
property to their places of origin. There was a temporary reversal of
the evolving principle of restitution or return of cultural objects during
the Napoleonic Wars because France saw itself as a "repository" for
the treasures of conquered nations. 19
The next global change came when Francis Lieber drafted the "code
of conduct by belligerent forces in war" for application to the conduct
of Union forces during the American Civil War. 98 Articles 34-36 dealt
specifically with the protection of cultural property. In particular,
article 35 provided that "[c]lassical works of art, libraries, scientific
collections... must be secured against all avoidable injury, even when
they are contained in fortified places whilst besieged or bombarded."''
Article 36 stipulated that a conquering nation could seize and remove
works of art, libraries and so on and that ultimate ownership would
be negotiated by a treaty of peace. Furthermore, article 36 stated that
cultural property could not be "sold or given away, if captured by
the armies of the United States," or "privately appropriated or wan-
tonly destroyed or injured." The "Lieber Code," as it is called, was
a significant accomplishment because it represented the first attempt
at a comprehensive codification dealing with the "obligations of bel-
ligerents" in the area of preservation and disposition of cultural prop-
erty. 20
1
The Lieber Code was succeeded by a number of other agreements
dealing with cultural property. In 1899, a conference of twenty-six
nations convened at The Hague produced the "Convention with Re-
spect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land."1202 Subsequently in
1907, forty-four nations adopted appended regulations to the 1899
document. Although these conventions did not deal exclusively with
the subject of cultural property, the drafters believed that cultural
matters were important and addressed them in this context. In partic-
ular "Hague IV 1907" provided for the protection of "historic mon-
uments," "art," and "science." 203
196. Id. at 757 (citations omitted).
197. Id. at 758.
198. John H. Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property, 80 AM.
J. INT'L L. 831, 833 (1986) [hereinafter Merryman, Cultural Property].
199. Id. (citations omitted).
200. Id. at 834 (citations omitted).
201. Id. at 835.
202. Id. at 834 (citing July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, T.S. No. 403).
203. Id. at 834-35.
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The Treaty on the Protection of Artistic and Scientific Institutions
and Monuments (the Roerich Pact), promulgated in 1935, was the first
international convention which dealt exclusively with the matter of
protection of cultural property.? This pact was.followed by a League
of Nations Draft Declaration and Draft International Convention for
the Protection of Monuments and Works of Art in Time of War.
20
Despite the developing body of law in this area during World War
II, the Axis Powers confiscated an incredible amount of cultural
property.2 The pillage did not go unnoticed. The Allied Powers
condemned the Axis Powers for their unauthorized property takings.
As a result, the Axis Powers were held accountable for "ensuring the
restitution of cultural property removed from [occupied or controlled]
national territory." 207 This requirement of restitution even extended to
confiscations which predated World War II. In situations where cul-
tural property was irretrievably lost, the responsible states were re-
quired to substitute equivalent property of equal value. The Allied
Powers' demand thus went even farther than insisting upon cultural
property return. The Allied Powers literally required offending nations
to effect the "positive reconstruction of national patrimonies." 208
The Roerich Pact and the League of Nations work, though important
at the time, became obsolete with the advent of World War II and
corresponding technical and strategic advances in warfare. As a result,
the fate of cultural property during wartime was addressed in a doc-
ument promulgated by UNESCO known as the 1954 Hague Convention
for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict
(Hague '54).20 Hague '54, still operative today, contains the protective
provisions of previous conventions in addition to certain innovations.
These innovations include a lack of distinction between public and
private property and an extension of the parties' obligations to peace-
time concerns.210 Despite Hague '54's supplementations of the earlier
Hague Conventions, it makes only a brief reference to private law
actions for the restoration of illegally removed cultural property.
21'
The failure to mention restitution of cultural property should not be
204. Id. at 835 (citing Apr. 15, 1935, 49 Stat. 3267, T.S. No. 899, 167 L.N.T.S.
279).
205. Id. (citing 1 U.S. DEP'T oF STATE, DocuMENTs AND STATE PAPERS 859 (1949)).
206. Graham, supra note 195, at 765.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 215.
210. Graham, supra note 195, at 768-69. The peacetime concerns Graham cites
include the state's responsibility for warproofing cultural property and the government's
role in instructing the armed forces to assist occupied territory governments to protect
cultural property.
211. Id. at 770.
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interpreted as a deliberate departure from past policy. Silence or in
this case near silence is often insignificant, and Hague '54 did not
contain any statements which discredited the return obligation.
John Merryman believes Hague '54 is significant because it char-
acterizes certain property as part of the "cultural heritage of all
mankind. '212 In doing so, Hague '54 provides a justification for
international cooperation in the protection of cultural property. Whereas
past documents laid the theoretical groundwork for according cultural
property international deference, Hague '54 explicitly articulated this
idea.213 Merryman's doctrine of "cultural internationalism" undermines
the legitimacy of obligatory repatriation because he deems cultural
objects to belong not to the state of origin, but to the whole world.
214
The concept of a worldwide cultural heritage, however, is not irrec-
oncilable with mandatory repatriation. It is possible to view cultural
objects as being part of a "coherent national patrimon[y]" within a
"common treasure of mankind. ' 215 The international community may
have an interest in protecting cultural treasures while still recognizing
those treasures as property of individual states.
Of course there are situations where the concepts of repatriation
and cultural internationalism may clash. The infamous controversy
surrounding the removal of the Elgin Marbles from Greece is a case
in point. The Greeks insist that Lord Elgin of Great Britain exceeded
his authority when he took these priceless sculptures from the Par-
therton and subsequently sold them to the British Museum. Since the
early 1980s the Greeks have been extremely vocal in demanding the
return of this cultural treasure, which they feel forms part of the heart
and soul of Greek culture and identity.2 6 The British have been equally
forceful in their counterargument that the Greeks do not have the
proper facilities to protect the marbles from pollution induced decay.
Hence, in this situation there are competing claims founded on diver-
gent philosophies regarding the legitimacy of returning cultural prop-
erty. 217
212. Merryman, Cultural Property, supra note 198, at 836 (citing Hague '54, supra
note 209, at preamble, 249 U.N.T.S. at 240). The full language of the preamble that
Merrnan examines is:
Being convinced that damage to cultural property belonging to any
people whatsoever means damage to the cultural heritage of all mankind,
since each people makes its contribution to the culture of the world;
Considering that the preservation of the cultural heritage is of great
importance for all peoples of the world and that it is important that this
heritage should receive international protection ....
Id.
213. Id. at 837.
214. There are other aspects of cultural internationalism not germane to the subject
matter at hand. See id. at 842 for further reference to this doctrine.
215. Graham, supra note 195, at 766.
216. Merryman, Elgin Marbles, supra note 22, at 1883.
217. This writer wishes to acknowledge that the controversy surrounding the proper
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Although no easy reconciliation of the conflicting positions exists,
conventions subsequent to Hague '54 and the plethora of documented
cases of return support the idea that tip the scales in favor of a custom
of return over one of cultural internationalism. Under this analysis,
Great Britain's refusal to return the Elgin Marbles would be a violation
of established customary international law, pure and simple.
Another example of the conflict of philosophies lies in the case of
the Zuni War Gods. The Zunis allow the War Gods to disintegrate as
part of the religious observance. Based on the "common heritage of
mankind" and "cultural internationalism" schools of thought, states
may reject repatriation claims because the Gods are lost as part of the
ritual. The arguments against return should fail both because the Zunis
currently practice the religion and because preservation as embodied
in cultural internationalism remains a mere policy statement, not an
international law argument. Although interesting academically, the
cultural internationalism view has limited impact against an established
custom of return.
In 1972, UNESCO adopted the Convention Concerning the Protec-
tion of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (the Heritage Con-
vention).2 1 This convention promoted the concept of an international
cultural heritage and the drafters designed it to make each state
responsible for safeguarding, preserving, and rendering accessible "the
items of the common heritage lying within its boundaries.1 21 9 Although
the drafters wrote the Heritage Convention in terms of a world com-
mon cultural heritage, a careful parsing of the language reveals that
the drafters still accord deference to the territorial boundaries of the
individual states in which the cultural artifacts reside. Article 6(1)
states:
Whilst fully respecting the sovereignty of the States on
whose territory the cultural and natural heritage mentioned
in Articles 1 and 2 is situated, and without prejudice to
property rights provided by national legislation, the States
home of the Marbles is far more complicated then a reader would presume from the
brief mention made in this paper. For example, the British also claim that the Greeks
would have a problem of standing in a court case due to the succession of Modern
Greece to the Athenian Republic, that there would be statute of limitation problems,
and that the British Museum would be unable to return the Marbles because of
restrictions of domestic law. The Gieeks claim that title to the Marbles did not pass,
that it was defective, that the original document entitling Elgin to take the Marbles was
never seen by anyone, and that there is a presumption against a state giving away its
own public property. For a thorough discussion of this controversy, see JEANETTE
GREENFIELD, THE RaruRN op CULTURAL TREASURas 47-105 (1989) (chapter 2), or Mer-
ryman, Elgin Marbles, supra note 22.
218. Nov. 16, 1972, 27 U.S.T. 37, T.I.A.S. No. 8226.
219. Graham, supra note 195, at 776.
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Parties to this Convention recognize that such heritage con-
stitutes a world heritage for whose protection it is the duty
of the international community as a whole to co-operate. 220
Article 6(1) strongly suggests that one state could not simply march
over the border of another to unilaterally remove or restore a deteri-
oratihg national monument. In further support of this interpretation,
article 13(1) provides that impoverished nations may request interna-
tional assistance in fulfilling their obligations under the convention.
There would be no need to include this proviso if the "cultural
internationalism" custom prevailed because cultural internationalism
would entitle states to engage in restoration or preservation self-help.
Although the Heritage Convention deals with immovable property and
thus does not address the issue of return, the tone of the document
suggests the drafters remained paramountly concerned about cultural
property's national affiliation. If one carries this thought to its logical
conclusion, it would be proper for states to return movable cultural
artifacts wrongfully removed from a source nation. This brings us into
the next part of the discussion which is where one can find evidence
of t:he cultural property return practice.
International Conventions Supporting the Return of Cultural
Property
Although it is not the first peacetime policy statement supporting
the practice of return, the UNESCO Convention on the Means of
Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of
Ownership of Cultural Property (UNESCO '70)221 remains one of the
most significant pieces of work in this area.m Drafters enacted UNESCO
'70 to prohibit the illegal export and import of cultural property and
to facilitate its return through governmental cooperation. One com-
mentator criticized UNESCO '70 for being "full of provisions that
seem unintelligible, self-contradictory, or unrealistic" ;223 nonetheless,
220. The Heritage Convention, 27 U.S.T. at 37 (emphasis added).
221. Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231 (1972), 10 I.L.M. 289 (1971).
222. Predecessors to UNESCO '70 include: Resolution XIV, Protection of Movable
Monuments, of the Seventh International Conference of American States of 1933; three
draft international conventions promulgated by the League of Nations in 1933, 1936,
and 1939; and UNESCO Recommendation on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing
the Illicit Export, Import and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property of 1964. See
Merrman, Cultural Property, supra note 198, at 842 & nn. 38-40. Also beginning in
1960, a number of African and Asian states under the auspices of the Economic and
Social Council of the United Nations General Assembly began to demand the repatriation
of cultural objects they considered part of their national heritages. See Graham, supra
note 195, at 771.





this Convention significantly places emphasis on the concepts of na-
tional cultural patrimonies and return to source nations. 22 The Pre-
amble contains important language:
Considering that cultural property constitutes one of the
basic elements of civilization and national culture, and that
its true value can be appreciated only in relation to the
fullest possible information regarding its origin, history and
traditional setting,
Considering that it is incumbent upon every State to
protect the cultural property existing within its territory
against the dangers of theft, clandestine excavation and
illicit export ....
The preamble sets up the argument for a policy of return because it
suggests that cultural property has its greatest value and impact in its
original setting.
Consider UNESCO 70's definition of property:
For the purposes of this Convention, the term "cultural
property" means property which, on religious or secular
grounds, is specifically designated by each State as being of
importance for archaeology, prehistory, history, literature,
art or science and which belongs to the following catego-
ries: ...
(f) objects of ethnological interest;
(g) property of artistic interest such as: ...
(ii) original works of statuary art and sculpture in any
material; ... 22
This definition suggests that states must distinguish particular items
which comprise the cultural patrimony. The specificity of requirements
precludes a country from identifying all art objects as nationally
significant, thus eliminating one of the primary objections to the law
of return.
Under a system where a country can claim all national art as its
own, a particular country can demand the return of art simply by
224. Id.; see also GREENmLD, supra note 217, at 258. Greenfield summarized some
of UNESCO '70's shortcomings as dependency on each state's own definition of cultural
property, dependency on each state implementing enabling legislation, direct application
of convention only to property stolen from institutions, lack of retroactivity. See also
Clements, supra note 28, at 14-15. Clements stated that Canadian case law elucidates
the "ineffectual nature of [the Convention's] enforcement and international co-operation
provisions." She nevertheless concedes that UNESCO '70 is "the single most important
document concerning restitution of cultural property." Id.
225. UNESCO '70, supra note 221, at preamble, 823 U.N.T.S. at 232 (emphasis
added).
226. Id. art. I., 823 U.N.T.S. at 234.
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submitting evidence of the art's national origin. Art-importing nations
worry that a system in which countries could demand the return of
all art created in that country would result in the wholesale emptying
of their museums. Museum curators and foreign governments frown
upon this prospect, particularly when an object has been in a foreign
museum for a lengthy period of time and has become part of the
cultural patrimony of the adoptive state.27 UNESCO '70 seems to
imply that cultural objects must be of special significance to the country
in order to justify their returnYm 8 The limited circumstances under
which return is appropriate (at least under UNESCO '70) should
mollify the most ardent opponents of the custom.
The Zuni War Gods fit into the UNESCO '70 definition of cultural
property as either objects of ethnological interest or sculpture. As
stated earlier, the Zunis consider the War Gods a vital part of their
cultural and religious heritage and thus the Gods would easily come
under the terms of the Convention.
Article 5 of the Convention stipulates that states that are party to
the Convention should authorize the drafting of laws and regulations
to "secure the protection of the cultural heritage" and prevent the
"illicit import, export and transfer of ownership of important cultural
property."' " This comment instructs states to pass enabling legislation
so that the precepts of the Convention can be implemented on a state
by state basis.
Article 7 instructs signatory states to "take appropriate steps to
recover and return any such cultural property" after the convention
is in force.30 Although this provision does not technically require states
to return cultural property, the document most certainly anticipates
retmn. The last applicable provision, article 15, states:
227. Merryman, Cultural Property, supra note 198.
228. Of course, one can argue that since the state decides what cultural property
remains important to its cultural integrity, it may in fact declare that all cultural property
is equally precious and must be returned. Although this remains a theoretical possibility,
it is unlicely. First of all, many of the art rich nations do not possess sufficient resources
both i:o secure the return and then to document, study, warehouse, preserve, and display
the artifacts once they are retrieved. States generally concentrate on securing the return
of the most important or sacred works. Second, in some cases, the decision of which
cultural objects form a national patrimony has been made through joint intergovern-
mental cooperation. For example, in a bilateral treaty between Mexico and the United
States, only objects "outstanding to the national patrimony" are subject to return. See
infra text accompanying notes 243-44. This treaty provides that both governments or a
panel of qualified experts selected by both governments decide what articles are included
in this description. The source state does not decide alone. Many states have recently
implemented legislation which prohibits the export of all cultural property but the
relevant acts are prospective. These acts alone will not mandate the return of objects
which were illegally conveyed before legislative enactment.
229. UNESCO '70, supra note 221, art. 5, 823 U.N.T.S. at 238.
231). Id. art. 7, 823 U.N.T.S. at 240.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol17/iss2/5
COMMENTS
Nothing in this Convention shall prevent States Parties
thereto from concluding special agreements among them-
selves or from continuing to implement agreements already
concluded regarding the restitution of cultural property re-
moved, whatever the reason, from its territory of origin,
before the entry into force of this Convention from the
States concerned.231
Article 15 authorizes continued cooperation between individual states
which have taken it upon themselves to negotiate the return of cultural
property removed prior to the operational date of the Convention.
This provision reinforces the shared value of returning cultural prop-
erty.
In summary, UNESCO '70 provides persuasive evidence of a custom
of return. As of 1986, fifty-eight nations were party to the Convention.
A number of art-importing or "market" nations, however, did not
sign on to the Convention presumably because it represented a threat
to their large storehouses of foreign artifacts. Significantly, two art
importing nations, the United States and Canada, are parties to the
Convention. m2 The fact that the United States supports the concept of
repatriation can only be helpful to any future Zuni claims for War
Gods that reside in American collections.
Although the Convention deals with the "illicit" transfer of cultural
property, illicit has become less meaningful as a qualifying term be-
cause many art rich or "source" nations have promulgated laws that
make export of all cultural property illegal.233 Under this regime any
transferred art is "illicit" by definition.
The European Convention On Offences Relating To Cultural Prop-
erty, a regional agreement, supports return. As of 1985, Cyprus,
Greece, Italy, Liechtenstein, Portugal and Turkey had become signa-
tories. The Convention provides for cooperation among the member
states of the Council of Europe in preventing offenses relating to
cultural property. Particularly significant is part IV, article 6, which
states that "[t]he Parties undertake to co-operate with a view to the
restitution of cultural property found on their territory, which has
been removed from the territory of another Party subsequent to an
offence relating to cultural property."3 5 Article 8 stipulates that the
return of cultural property "shall" take place even where extradition
231. Id. art. 5, 823 U.N.T.S. at 244.
232. Merryman, Elgin Marbles, supra note 22, at 1893.
233. Merryman, Cultural Property, supra note 198, at 843.
234. June 23, 1985, 25 I.L.M. 44 (1986).
235. Id. pt. IV, art. 6, 25 I.L.M. at 45.
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of an offender of cultural property protection laws is impossible.2 6
UNESCO Recommendations and General Assembly Resolutions
There are a number of recommendations adopted by UNESCO which
dead with the return of cultural property. These recommendations
constitute evidence of a custom of return.2Y7 In addition, the United
Naions General Assembly has adopted a number of resolutions re-
garding cultural property. Although General Assembly resolutions do
not bind states like international agreements, they often provide evi-
dence of customary international law."3s A large number of states have
signed these resolutions thus making them noteworthy.
Resolution 3148 reiterated the UNESCO doctrines of the "common
cultural heritage" and "respect for national sovereignty."2 9 This res-
oluion was adopted in 1973 by a vote of 123 to 0 with 5 abstentions.
Ziare proposed and eleven African nations sponsored Resolution 3187,
also known under the title Restoring Works of Art to Countries Victims
of Expropriation. It was adopted by a vote of 113 to 0 with 17
abstentions. The seventeen abstaining nations comprised most of the
major art importers including Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
FRG, France, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
No way, Portugal, South Africa, United Kingdom and the United
States.24
The art importing nations' abstention should not be interpreted as
a rejection of the idea of cultural property repatriation. These nations
failed to support Resolution 3187 because its language was more radical
and demanding than the language of previous statements on the same
subject.2' Subsequent resolutions through 1983 have reaffirmed inter-
national cooperation in repatriation of cultural property, but they have
emphasized gradual as opposed to immediate change. 2
2!16. Other regional agreements exist which deal with cultural property including The
Organization of American States Convention on The Protection of the Archaeological,
Historical and Artistic Heritage of the American Nations, 15 I.L.M. 1350 (1976) and
the Andean Region, Andres Bello Convention, Jan. 31, 1970, in HISTORIA DOCUMENTAL
DEL ACUERDO DE CARTAGENA 537 (1970). African and Asian regional organizations have
been established to deal with cultural matters as well. See Graham, supra note 195, at
782.
23.7. It is beyond the scope of this paper to address the many recommendations
made by UNESCO. See Graham, supra note 195, for an excellent discussion of these
reconmendations.
238. JAhNS, supra note 61, at 43 (in an advisory opinion on the Western Sahara the
International Court of Justice relied on General Assembly resolutions to establish basic
legal principles regarding self-determination).
239. Graham, supra note 195, at 780 (discussing Resolution 3148, U.N. Doc. A/
Res./3148 (XVIII) (1973)).






In addition to the multilateral conventions, recommendations and
resolutions set forth by various organs of the United Nations, various
bilateral state to state agreements exist which deal with the repatriation
of cultural property. One such agreement is The Treaty of Cooperation
Between the United States of America and The United Mexican States
Providing For the Recovery and Return of Stolen Archaeological,
Historical and Cultural Properties.23 Like UNESCO '70, the United
States-Mexico Treaty does not apply to all artifacts. It applies to art
objects and religious artifacts "of outstanding historical importance"
or "outstanding importance to the national patrimony." 2" The agree-
ment requires each party to "employ the legal means at its disposal
to recover and return from its territory stolen ... properties that are
removed after the date of entry into force of th[e] Treaty."245 This
treaty has an interesting feature. If the requested state cannot effect
the recovery and return of a particular artifact, it is under an obligation
to institute appropriate judicial proceedings. 6
The United States-Mexico treaty is only one among many state-state
international agreements. Agreements also exist, for example, between
the United States and Peru2'7 and the United States and Ecuador.2
The titles and mandates of these treaties are nearly identical to the
United States-Mexico treaty. This consistency is significant because it
has been said, "[i]f bilateral treaties,... are habitually framed in the
same way, a court may regard the usual form as the law even in the
absence of a treaty obligation." 9 In other words, bilateral treaties
may provide evidence of customary international law.
National Legislation Schemes
Most states have legislation schemes which deal with the illicit
transport of cultural property. As of, 1981, only six or seven countries
did not have some sort of regulation of cultural property or export
control law.210 The philosophy of intrinsic value of the national pat-
rimony underlies these laws.
For example, the United States, after more than ten years of delib-
eration, enacted the Convention on Cultural Property Implementation
243. July 17, 1990, 22 U.S.T. 494, T.I.A.S. No. 7088, 791 U.N.T.S. 313.
244. Id. art. I, I(b), (c) (emphasis added).
245. Id. art. 111(l).
246. Id. art. 111(3).
247. Agreement for the Recovery and Return of Stolen Archaeological, Historical,
and Cultural Properties, Sept. 15, 1981, U.S.-Peru, 33 U.S.T. 1607.
248. Agreement for the Recovery and Return of Stolen Archaeological, Historical,
and Cultural Properties, Nov. 17, 1983, U.S.-Ecuador, T.I.A.S. No. 11075.
249. BROWNLm, supra note 48, at 13-14.
250. GREENma, supra note 217, at 241.
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Act in pursuance of the ideals set forth in UNESCO '70. 251 In addition,
the United States passed a statute, the Regulation of Importation of
Pre-Columbian Monumental or Architectural Sculpture or Murals Act, 252
to deal with the illegal export of pre-Columbian art. This statute
specifically authorizes the return of stolen cultural property. Another
Animerican statute, the National Stolen Property Act (NSPA)253 imposes
criminal liability on persons caught transporting cultural property in
violation of another state's antiquities laws.24 Under NSPA, signators
consider Cultural artifacts transported across American state lines, in
violation its provisions, stolen. Although the perpetrator of a crime is
subject to punishment, NSPA does not clearly specify whether confis-
cated objects must be automatically returned to the source state.
The results under the NSPA highlight some practical problems.
Despite the good intentions of international conventions and resolu-
tions, a claiming country still finds obstacles in securing the restitution
of its property. Like the NSPA, other countries' cultural property
statutes do not contain return provisions. A claiming state must engage
in protracted negotiations or litigation to retrieve a particular artifact.
In addition, repatriation difficulties arise when states do not have
import control regulations for cultural objects.251 Although difficulties
arise in effecting the swift return of cultural property, customary
international law requires rapid and easily facilitated return.
It is important not to oversimplify the issues surrounding the move-
ment and return of cultural property. This area, inextricably inter-
twined with art law, individual states' law and international law, is
extremely complex. Not surprisingly, a smooth coordinated practice of
repatriation has not immediately followed the written expression of
many states' highest ideals. Repatriation remains an emotionally charged
subject. States often tend towards psychological ambivalence regarding
repatriation. There is a sense of loss when a nation decides to return
a cherished object to the rightful owner.
Perhaps the legal complexities and the emotional component of
repatriation explain why national statutes lag behind the right-minded
international conventions. Nevertheless, the doctrine of repatriation
has been memorialized in an extensive array of agreements. This
documentation along with the many instances of return support the
251. Act of Jan. 12, 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-446, 96 Stat. 2329 (codified at 19 U.S.C.
§ 2601 (Supp. 1 1983)) (Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act).
252. Pub. L. No. 92-587, 86 Stat. 1296 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2091-2095 (1976)).
253. 18 U.S.C. § 2315 (1988).
254. James A.R. Nafziger, International Penal Aspects of Protecting Cultural Prop-
erty, 19 INT'L LAW. 835, 843 (1985) (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 2311-2319 (1976)).
255. GRanEmwa.D, supra note 217, at 243. For example, restitution becomes more
complicated when a bona fide purchaser buys the property, or when property is illegally
transported but has not been stolen.
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existence of the custom. Actual examples abound of the widespread
and long-standing practice of the return of cultural property.
Examples of the Return of Cultural Property
Many states have returned significant cultural artifacts to other
states. Both the sheer number of objects returned and the universality
of the practice confirm the existence of the custom. 6 The return of
several Icelandic manuscripts in 1971 dramatically illustrates repatria-
tion of cultural property.
In the seventeenth century, when Iceland was a colony of Denmark,
a number of priceless Icelandic manuscripts were sent to the King of
Denmark. Among them included Flateyjarbok, a two-volume collection
of Icelandic sagas and Codex Regius, which contained Elder Edda, a
major existing source of Norse mythological poetry. The manuscripts
were sent to be published but they remained in the Royal Library in
Copenhagen. In the nineteenth century a great surge of nationalism
arose among the Icelandic people. During this period the Icelandic
manuscripts came to symbolize Iceland's national heritage. Along with
talk of separation from Denmark came a popular movement for the
return of the manuscripts.
7
In 1945, when Iceland constitutionally separated from Denmark, the
public demanded the return of the manuscripts once again. Icelandic
experts stated that these manuscripts were cultural treasures that "kept
the nation alive for centuries, . . . were an anchor of Iceland's cul-
ture,... [and] were the cornerstone of Icelandic nationality and lan-
guage. ' ' 1S Such issues as who owned the manuscripts, who could best
take care of them, and whether the return would involve an uncon-
stitutional expropriation of private property were resolved in a pro-
tracted and complicated battle between Iceland and Denmark. After
approximately thirty years of intergovernmental negotiations and liti-
gation (to which Iceland itself was not party), Flateyjarbok and Codex
Regius were returned.
Adjudicated by the International Court of Justice, the following
case exemplifies the intergovernmental row over who held ownership
to certain cultural properties.2 9 The Case Concerning the Temple of
Preah Vihear involved conflicting claims of Cambodia and Thailand
256. This writer defines "universality of practice" as follows: states representative
of all legal systems, cultures, and geographic locations subscribe to the practice of
return. This is in contrast to a situation where return is only prevalent, for example,
in a particular region or amongst a particular group of states who share a political
ideology.
257. GREENFnaD, supra note 217.
258. Id. at 45.
259. Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Camb. v. Thail.), 1962 I.C.J. 6 (June
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to various sculptures, stelae, fragments of monuments, sandstone mod-
els and ancient pottery which Thai authorities had from a Temple.
260
Given the artifacts remained housed in a temple situated on land that
was claimed by both countries, the dispute involved difficult issues.
Upon determining that the land was Cambodian territory, the court
held that the claim for restitution was "implicit in and consequential
on" the -claim for territorial sovereignty.2 61 Based on this analysis,
Cambodia was entitled to a finding of restitution in principle, although
the court refused to grant the requested relief because of an evidentiary
problem. 2
62
Although no legally binding precedent exists in the decisions of the
International Court of Justice, the holdings offer persuasive authority
as to what the relevant international law is in a given subject area.26
Sir Hersch Lauterpacht wrote that the court "has made a tangible
contribution to the development and clarification of the rules and
principles of international law.''264 This case advances the notion that
custom supports returning cultural property to the source state. In
fact, the property need not hold particular intrinsic cultural value to
the claiming state. Thus, in Temple Preah Vihear, the International
Cou:rt of Justice required less of a showing than the custom advocated
by this writer.
One could go on almost ad infinitum citing the incidents of resti-
tution of cultural property. Jeanette Greenfield, in her elegant and
exhaustive book on the return of cultural property, neatly outlined a
number of the case studies. A few will be presented here:
In 1950 there was an agreement between France and Laos
about the restitution of Laotian objects of art.
In 1968 an agreement between France and Algeria led to
the return of some three hundred paintings which had been
exhibited in the Museum of Algiers between 1930 and 1962.
In 1973 the Brooklyn Museum returned a stela fragment
stolen from Piedras Negras to Guatemala. Although the
260. Gamqmplw, supra note 217, at 101-02.
261. Id. at 286.
262. No concrete evidence had been submitted to the court to show that the objects
had been removed from the temple since its occupation in 1954.
263. See JANms, supra note 61, at 118. Article 59 of the Statute of the Court states,
"The decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in
respect of that particular case." United Nations Statute of the International Court of
Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 1062, T.S. No. 93, at 32. On the other hand,
article 38(1)(d) states courts may apply "subject to the provisions of Art. 59, judicial
decisioas and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations,
as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law." Id., 59 Stat. at 1060, T.S.
No. 993, at 30.
264. J.A s, supra note 61, at 117 (citation omitted and emphasis added).
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museum had legal ownership of the fragments, it entered
into correspondence with the Guatemalan government to
determine what should be done about the section of Stela
3 in its possession. In 1970 the museum placed the fragments
at the disposal of the Instituto de Antropologia de Historia
de Guatemala. On 6 June 1972, when the director, Duncan
F. Cameron, turned them over to ... [the] Guatemalan
Ambassador to the United States, he noted that they "con-
stitute a part of an historical document more important in
the land of its origin than in this country."
In 1977 Belgium returned several thousand cultural items
to Zaire ....
In 1980 France and Iraq arranged for mutual long-term
loans under which fragments of Babylonian codes, contem-
poraneous with the code of Hammurabi, which had been
held in the Louvre for study. France returned the code
fragments to the Iraq Museum in Baghdad.
In 1981 the Australian Museum trust returned a large cer-
emonial slit-drum to Vanuatu (New Hebrides). 20
At the end of World War II, the United States Army seized a
collection of 8754 works of German art commissioned by Hitler to
glorify the Third Reich. For many years the West German government
requested the return of these works. In 1986, after years of negotiations
and an authorizing act of Congress, 6255 of the pieces were returned
to Germany.2"
Based on all of the evidence set forth, it has been demonstrated
international customary law exists which governs states' obligations to
return cultural property.
Pulling It All Together - Why the Zuni Tribe Has a Persuasive
Claim Under Customary International Law
It has already been established that the Zuni Tribe can make a
legitimate claim to statehood. As a subject of international law, the
tribe can take advantage of the international custom which mandates
265. GREENFIELD, supra note 217, at 260-65. Greenfield is an excellent source for
further documentation of incidents of return. With reference to the 1980 return of
artifacts from France to Iraq, as of 1982, France had not returned the much sought
after 3,000 year-old Code of Hammurabi to Iraq. See David Fouquet, More Nations
Ask for Return of Art, Cmus ur Sc. MoNTrOR, Nov. 4, 1982, at 6.
266. Penny Pagano, U.S. Will Return German Art Created Under Hitler's Rule,
L.A. TruEs, Mar. 6, 1986, pt. 1, at 15.
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the return of cultural property. Even if the custom is narrowly con-
strued, the Zuni claim to the War Gods would still be well within the
boundaries of the custom because the War Gods are part of the Zunis'
national patrimony.
A state could not make a persuasive slippery slope argument that
the tribe would attempt to claim absolutely every artifact if it returned
the War Gods. The Zunis claim the War Gods because they remain
vital to the integrity and the spiritual well-being of the tribe, not simply
because tribal members created them in Zuni country. Of course, the
outcome in the Temple Preah Vihear Case and the views of some
comrnentators suggest that an artifact's place of origin alone justifies
its return to the source country.
Though the War Gods fit neatly into the cultural property subca-
tegories as defined in treaties and agreements, they become more than
just cultural property. They are the sacred religious objects of a living,
breathing people. Thus, a special imperative exists which justifies the
War Gods' prompt return. This is not to suggest that the modern day
Egyptians or Peruvians who no longer practice the ancient religions
have no legitimate claim to the artifacts of their ancestors under the
custom of return. But a people which continues to practice its time
honored rituals has a repatriation claim carrying tremendous moral
force.
The Zunis believe that the War Gods were wrongfully conveyed.
The War Gods remain community property and therefore no one
individual has the right to give or sell them to another.2 7 Furthermore,
the tribe possesses documented evidence that all War Gods not at their
shrines were stolen.m The fact that title could never have been passed
legally also helps to strengthen and consolidate the Zuni claim under
international law.
Conclusion
The Zuni Tribe may secure status under international law. It may
make a claim that it is a state on a limited basis, that is, only for
cultural purposes. The tribe may also claim that it becomes a full-
fledged state because it fulfills the four elements of statehood. In the
event that a claim to statehood is not accepted, the tribe may try to
seek admission to the trusteeship system of the United Nations.
Customary international law requires a state to return cultural ob-
jects to another state when the particular objects possess a special
significance to the national patrimony of the claimant. This custom is
especially binding when the objects in question were wrongfully con-
267. See supra text accompanying note 18.
268. See supra note 16.
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veyed. The elements of this custom, a generalized consistent practice
over some significant duration which is engaged in as a matter of
obligation, are satisfied. Evidence of the custom exists in international
conventions, regional agreements, bilateral treaties, UNESCO recom-
mendations, United Nations General Assembly resolutions, the practice
of states, and numerous documented cases of return.
Some of the complexities inherent in the return of cultural objects
must be worked out over time. Nevertheless, the backbone of the
custom is in place. The Zuni Tribe in its capacity as a sovereign nation
may make an international law claim to secure the repatriation of the
sacred War Gods.
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